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DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD.

MORAL REFLECTIONS,

SENTENCES AND MAXIMS

OF

FRANCIS,
DUC DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD.

NEWLY TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

MORAL SENTENCES AND MAXIMS OF STANISLAUS, KING OF POLAND.

"As Rochefoucauld his maxims drew
From nature, I believe them true;
They argue no corrupted mind
In him; the fault is in mankind."

DR. SWIFT.

"Among the books in ancient and modern times which record the conclusions of observing men on the moral qualities of their fellows, a high place should be reserved for the Maxims of Rochefoucauld."

H. HALLAM.



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LIFE

OF

FRANCIS, DUKE OF ROCHEFOUCAULD.

FRANCIS, Duke of Rochefoucauld, Prince of Marsillac, a distinguished wit and nobleman of the reign of Louis XIV., was born in 1613. He distinguished himself as the most brilliant nobleman about the court, and by his share in the good graces of the celebrated Duchess of Longueville, was involved in the civil wars of the Fronde. He signalized his courage at the battle of St. Antoine, in Paris, and received a shot which for some time deprived him of his sight. At a more advanced period, his house was the resort of the best company at Paris, including Boileau, Racine, and the Mesdames Sevigné and La Fayette. By the former of these ladies, he is spoken of as holding the first rank in "courage, merit, tenderness, and good sense." The letters of Madame de Maintenon, also, speak of him with high, but inconsistent praise. Huet describes him as possessing a nervous temperament, which would not allow him to accept a seat in the French Academy, owing to his want of courage to make a public speech. The Duke de Rochefoucauld died with philosophic tranquillity, at Paris, in 1680, in his sixty-eighth year. This nobleman wrote "Mémoires de la Règne d'Anne d'Autriche," 2 vols. 12mo., 1713, an energetic and faithful representation of that fretful

predicament as Machiavelli with regard to political morality. J. J. Rousseau, who was certainly not free from selfishness, has abused La Rochefoucauld's maxims, and yet, in his "Emile," he observes that "selfishness is the mainspring of all our actions;" and that "authors, while they are ever talking of truth, which they care little about, think chiefly of their own interest, of which they do not talk." La Fontaine, in his fable, (b. i. 11,) "L' Homme et son Image," has made an ingenious defence of La Rochefoucauld's book. The "Maxims" receive a portion of their peculiar point from the very courtly scene of contemplation, and from the delicacy and finesse with which the veil is penetrated that is spread over the surface of refined society. It is well known that Swift was a decided admirer of Rochefoucauld, and his celebrated poem on his own death commences with an avowal of the fact.* The misanthropy of that great man renders his suffrage any thing but popular; but possibly, as in the doctrine of the invariable predominance of the stronger motive, that of self-love simply bespeaks a more strict attention to early cultivation and discipline, to render it not only compatible with virtue, but strictly and philosophically connected with the highest, the noblest, and, in common

* Dr. Swift wrote a poem of near five hundred lines upon the Maxims of Rochefoucauld, and was a long time about it. They were committed to the care of the celebrated author of "*The Test*;" an edition was printed in 1738, in which more than one hundred lines were omitted. Dr. King assigned many judicious reasons—though some of them were merely temporary aud prudential—for the mutilations; but they were so far from satisfying Dr. Swift, that a complete edition was immediately printed by Faulkner, with the dean's express permission.—*Swift's Works, Sheridan's Edition*, 19 vols., London, 1801.

language, the most disinterested fulfillment of all our duties.

La Rochefoucauld's "Maximes" have gone through many editions. The "Œuvres de la Rochefoucauld," 1818, contain, besides his already published works, several inedited letters and a biographical notice.

INTRODUCTION.

The family of La Rochefoucauld is one of the most ancient and illustrious in France. Its founder, according to Andrew Du Chesne, was one Foucauld, or Fulk, a *cadet*, as is supposed, of the house of Lusignan, or Lezignem, and connected with the ancient Dukes of Guienne, who appears, about the period A. D. 1000, as Seigneur, or Lord, of the Town of La Roche in the Angoumois. He is described in contemporary charters as *Vir nobilissimus Fulcaldus*, and his renown seems to have been sufficiently extensive to confer his name on La Roche, which has ever since borne, and bestowed on his descendants, the distinctive appellation of La Roche Foucauld. Guy, the eighth Seigneur de la Roche Foucauld, is mentioned by Froissart as having performed, in the year 1380, a celebrated tilt in the lists at Bordeaux, whither he came, attended by 200 of his kinsmen and connections.

Francis, the sixteenth seigneur, had the honor of being sponsor to, and bestowing his name on, King Francis I., and was shortly afterwards advanced to the dignity of Count de la Rochefoucauld. The widow of his son and successor, in the year 1539, entertained, at the family seat of Vertueil, the Emperor Charles V., and some of the Royal Family of France. The Emperor is reported by a contemporary historian to have said on his departure, that he had never entered a house which possessed such an air of

virtue, courtesy, and nobility as that. Francis, the fifth count, was created the Duke de la Rochefoucauld in 1622, and was father to Francis, the second duke, the celebrated author of the Maxims, who was born on the 15th December, 1613. The principal events of his life are matter of history rather than biography, as he was a leading actor in the numerous and complicated state intrigues which took place in France after the death of Louis XIII., and during the minority of his successor. It is extremely difficult at this period, and would hardly be worth while, to attempt to trace the course of these cabals and the wars to which they gave rise. Beyond the gratification of an absurd ambition, it is almost impossible to discover any object that the contending parties had in view; and the motives of individuals are still more difficult to penetrate, from the conflicting accounts given by the various actors themselves, of the transactions in which they were engaged. The impression left on the mind by a perusal of the histories of the times, is a painful sensation of the corruption of the government, the sad want of public, or even private, principle on the part of the higher classes, and the frivolity and folly generally prevalent in the society of the period. La Rochefoucauld was early engaged on the side of the Fronde, the party opposed to Mazarin, which was also espoused by the Duchesse de Longueville, (whose lover La Rochefoucauld then was,) by the Prince de Conti, and afterwards by the celebrated Condé. To these princes La Rochefoucauld appears to have remained faithful during all the subsequent mutations of the party. He took part in most of the military proceedings that resulted from the troubles of the times; and though he does not appear much in the character of a general, is universally allowed to have displayed the greatest bravery on all occasions. At the battle of St. An-

toine, near Paris, he received a severe wound in the head, which for a time deprived him of sight, and was the occasion of terminating his military career. Before he had recovered, the Fronde had fallen before the gold of Mazarin and the arms of Turenne. Condé was driven from France; and as the proclamation of the King's majority appeared likely to put an end to the miserable dissensions which had so long existed, La Rochefoucauld, with the consent of Condé, reconciled himself to the court, and returned to Paris, where he continued to live in the midst of the literary and fashionable society of the time until his death in 1680. His most attached friend was Madame de Lafayette, authoress of the *Princesse de Cleves;* but he was also intimately acquainted with Madame de Sevigné, (in whose letters repeated mention is made of him,) La Fontaine, Racine, Boileau, and most of the celebrated men of his age. La Rochefoucauld appears to have been a man of most amiable character and of high personal probity; for, amid the various party feelings of the writers of that period, scarcely any thing can be discovered in the accounts they have left which would throw discredit on him. He possessed brilliant powers of mind, but without any regular education; and an easiness of temper, combined, as it generally is, with fickleness and indecision, which is supposed to have led him to engage so constantly in the various intrigues of the time. He has left us an entertaining sketch of himself, which is subjoined, together with another character of him by Cardinal de Retz, his great enemy, and also a character of De Retz, by La Rochefoucauld.

In the leisure which succeeded to the stir of his early life, La Rochefoucauld composed the "Memoirs of his own Times," and the work on which his fame is founded, "Maxims and Moral Reflections." Voltaire's remark on the two

is well known, that the "Memoirs are read, and the Maxims are known by heart." It may be doubted, however, whether the "Memoirs" are often read at the present day, notwithstanding the extravagant compliment of Bayle, that "there are few people so bigoted to antiquity as not to prefer the 'Memoirs' of La Rochefoucauld to the 'Commentaries of Cæsar.'" In fact, their interest appears to have passed away with that of the times of which they treat.

The book of "Maxims" no doubt results from the observation of La Rochefoucauld's earlier years, combined with the reflection of his later life. He appears to have taken considerable pains with their composition, submitting them frequently for the approval of his numerous circle of friends, and altering some of them, according to Segrais, nearly thirty times. They were first published in 1665, with a preface by Segrais, which was omitted in the subsequent editions; several of which appeared, with various corrections, during the author's life.*

Scarcely any work, as Mr. Hallam observes, has been more highly extolled or more severely censured. Dr. Johnson has pronounced it almost the only book written by a man of fashion, of which professed authors had reason to be jealous. Rousseau calls it, (Conf. b. 3,) "livre triste et désolant," though he goes on to make a *naïve* admission of its truth, "principalement dans la jeunesse où l'on n'aime pas à voir l'homme comme il est." Voltaire's account of it, in his "Age of Louis XIV.," is perhaps the most gen-

* They were first translated into English in 1689, under the title of "Seneca unmasked," by the celebrated Mrs. Aphara Behn, who calls the author the Duke of *Rushfucave*. The work, as is the case with all the English translations of the "Maxims," is full of faults.

erally acquiesced in:—"One of the works which most contributed to form the taste of the nation, and to give it a spirit of justness and precision, was the collection of the 'Maxims' of Francis, Duc de la Rochefoucauld. Though there is scarcely more than one truth running through the book—that 'self-love is the motive of every thing;' yet this thought is presented under so many various aspects, that it is almost always striking; it is not so much a book as materials for ornamenting a book. This little collection was read with avidity; it taught people to think and to comprise their thoughts in a lively, precise, and delicate turn of expression. This was a merit which, before him, no one in Europe had attained, since the revival of letters."*

It would be difficult to give higher praise than this to the style of the "Maxims," to which, no doubt, the work owes a great part of its popularity. If not precisely the inventor, La Rochefoucauld is, at all events, the model of this mode of writing, in which success indeed is rare, but

* Notwithstanding their popularity, and Voltaire's assertion that they are known by heart, the "Maxims" have been most unblushingly pillaged on almost all sides; indeed there is hardly any modern collection of thoughts or aphorisms which is not indebted to this work. A late instance may be found in the review of Baron Wessenberg's "Thoughts," by the Quarterly Review, Dec., 1848, where it appears by the extracts that the baron adopts, as his own, one of the "Maxims," (No. 39,) which is quoted with approbation, and evidently unrecognized by the reviewer. Some plagiarisms may be detected in the illustrations quoted in the ensuing pages, which, however, have not been collected for that purpose so much, as to compare the manner in which different minds have expressed themselves on similar subjects. Many other illustrations of the "Maxims" will, of course, suggest themselves, according to the various extent of individual reading.

when attained, it has many charms for the reader.* "The writing in aphorisms," as Bacon observes, (*Adv. of Learn.*,) "hath may excellent virtues whereto the writing in method doth not approach. For first, it trieth the writer whether he be superficial or solid; for aphorisms, except they be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of example are cut off; discourse of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off: so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in method

Tantum series juncturaque pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,

as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy; but particulars being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire further;

* M. Villemain, in his "Eloge de Montaigne," seems to insinuate that La Rochefoucauld may have been indebted to Montaigne for the idea of the style of the "Maxims:" "Dans ce genre j'oserai dire qu'il (Montaigne) a donné le plus heureux modèles d'un style dont La Rochefoucauld passe ordinairement pour le premier inventeur." La Rochefoucauld was probably under many obligations in other respects to Montaigne; but it seems difficult to select two writers more dissimilar in their mode of expressing themselves than the rambling, gossiping Montaigne and the precise, sententious La Rochefoucauld.

whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest."

A principal cause of the attractiveness of this mode of writing lies in the necessarily epigrammatic turn of the sentences, which constantly arrests the attention; and while it stimulates the reader's reflection, renders the point of the observation more palpable and more easy to be retained in the memory. It is, besides, no mean advantage to be spared the exertion of wading through and deciding upon the successive stages, each perhaps admitting of discussion, of a tedious and involved argument, and to be presented at once with ready-made conclusions. Notwithstanding Bacon's second remark on aphorisms, it seems questionable whether the mind is not more disposed to assent to a proposition when clearly and boldly announced on the *ipse dixit* of a writer, than when arrived at as the termination of a chain of reasoning. Where so much proof is required, men are apt to think much doubt exists; and a simple enunciation of a truth is, on this account perhaps, the more imposing from our not being admitted, as it were, behind the scenes, and allowed to inspect the machinery which has produced the result. There is, besides, a yearning after infallibility to a greater or less degree latent in every human heart, that derives a momentary gratification from the oracular nature of these declarations of truth, which seem to be exempt from the faults and shortcomings of human reason, and to spring, with all the precision of instinct, full grown to light, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter.*

The chief, perhaps the only serious, defect incidental to this mode of composition, is the constantly recurring temptation to sacrifice the strict truth to the point of the maxim.

* See Aristot. Rhet. book ii. c. 21.

For the sake of rendering the turn of expression more smart and epigrammatic, truth is sometimes distorted, sometimes laid down in such general and unqualified terms as sober reason would not warrant. La Rochefoucauld is by no means free from this fault, which perhaps is inseparable from the species of composition we are considering, and may be regarded as the price we pay for its other advantages.

But while the style of the "Maxims" has been almost universally admired, the peculiar views of morals they present have been the subject of much cavil. The author is generally considered as a principal supporter of the selfish school of moralists; and, indeed, the popular opinion of the "Maxims" seems to be summed up in Voltaire's remark, that there is but one truth running through the book; that "self-love is the motive of every action." Bishop Butler's observations are to the same effect, (*Pref. to Sermons:*) "There is a strange affectation in some people of explaining away all particular affections, and representing the whole of life as nothing but one continued exercise of self-love. Hence arises that surprising confusion and perplexity in the Epicureans of old, Hobbes, the author of 'Reflections, &c. Morales,' and this whole set of writers, of calling actions interested which are done in contradiction of the most manifest known interest, merely for the gratification of a present passion. Now all this confusion might be avoided by stating to ourselves wherein the idea of self-love consists, as distinguished from all particular movements towards particular external objects, the appetites of sense, resentment, compassion, curiosity, ambition, and the rest. When this is done, if the words 'selfish' and 'interested' cannot be parted with, but must be applied to every thing, yet to avoid such total confusion of all language, let the

distinction be made by epithets,—and the first may be called cool or settled selfishness, and the other passionate or sensual selfishness. But the most natural way of speaking plainly is, to call the first only self-love, and the actions proceeding from it, interested; and to say of the latter, that they are not love to ourselves, but movements towards somewhat external, honor, power, the harm or good of another, and that the pursuit of these external objects, so far as it proceeds from these movements, (for it may proceed from self-love,) is no otherwise interested than as every action of every creature must from the nature of the thing be; for no one can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own." The confusion of language complained of by Butler, has certainly been the cause of much misapprehension on this subject; but it does not appear right to charge La Rochefoucauld with this ambiguity; on the contrary, it will be evident to any attentive reader of the "Maxims" that "self-love" and "interest" are clearly distinguished from each other. If it were not so, and La Rochefoucauld considered *interest* to be man's only motive, Maxims 415, that "Men more easily surrender their interests than their tastes," and 512, that "There are more people without interest than without envy," would involve palpable absurdities, In fact, "self-love" and "interest," in the "Maxims," stand to each other in their real relation of a whole and one of its parts.

With regard to the question whether La Rochefoucauld meant to represent self-love, in its more extended sense, as the motive of all human actions, it seems not altogether fair to charge him with the inculcation of any particular theory or system, in the same manner as if the maxims were formal deductions from a regularly reasoned treatise, instead of being, as they are, unconnected observations on

mankind and their actions. If he had, however, any regula design, it was not so much to point out self-love as the *primum mobile*, but rather to expose the hypocrisy and pre tence so current in the world under the name of virtue This will be apparent from the heading he prefixed to th work, "Our virtues are generally only disguised vices," an from the commencement of the last maxim, "After havin spoken of the falsity of so many apparent virtues," &c The key of his system (if he had one) would seem to li in the maxim, that "Truth does not do so much good, a its appearances do evil, in the world." The assumption o the name of virtue is prejudicial in many ways. It ope ates suicidally on the morals of the actor, because a lon course of imposition on others invariably ends in self-de ceit; "We are so much accustomed to disguise ourselve to others," as our Author remarks, "that at length we dis guise ourselves to ourselves." The history of the world i full of examples of men whose career is represented in thes words. But this assumption is still more pernicious to th interests of virtue itself. To use a common illustratior nothing depreciates a sound coinage more than the existenc of well-executed counterfeits. Nothing tends so much t disgust men with goodness, as the hollowness and artifici ality of what is palmed on them for goodness. Repeatedl disappointed in their search for the reality, they are led t doubt its existence, and it is this feeling which is embodie in the bitter exclamation of the despairing Roman:—"Vi tue, I have worshipped thee as a real good, but at length find thee an empty name."

If the maxims can aid men to distinguish the true fron the false, the sterling from the alloy, they are so far fron injuring the cause of virtue that they obviously render it a most important service. It will readily be admitted also

that any inquiry into the reality of virtue must go deeply into the theory of human motives. An action may be externally virtuous; but, when the motive comes to be examined, may prove to be deserving of censure rather than commendation. And it is evident that, to constitute a virtuous action a virtuous motive is absolutely necessary. "Celui," as La Bruyère observes, "qui loge chez soi dans un palais avec deux appartemens pour les deux saisons, vient coucher au Louvre dans un entresol, n'en use pas ainsi par modestie; et autre, qui pour conserver une taille fine s'abstient du vin et ne fait qu'un seul repas, n'est ni sobre ni tempérant; et d'un troisième, qui, importuné d'un ami pauvre, lui donne enfin quelque secours, l'on dit qu'il achète son repos et nullement qu'il est libéral. Le motif seul fait le mérite des actions des hommes, et le désintéressement y met la perfection."* The last illustration will recall the parable of the unjust judge, which is familiar to every one. In these instances the result may be beneficial; but, so far as the actor is concerned, this is evidently an accidental effect to which it would be preposterous to give the name of virtue.

It is this inquiry, then, into the motives of men which La Rochefoucauld appears to have had in view in the "Maxims," and in prosecuting this he has pointed out that a vast part of what passes in the world for virtue and goodness, is by no means genuine, but the result of meaner and more debased principles of action. He has unmasked with consummate skill the appearances of virtue so fre-

* Montaigne is rather more plain spoken. "We ought to love temperance for itself, and in obedience to God who has commanded it and chastity; but what I am forced to by catarrhs, or owe to the stone, is neither chastity nor temperance."

quently put forward by men, and every one must be ente tained by the exquisite subtlety of manner in which he h laid bare feelings and motives always most carefully hi den, often unacknowledged, sometimes unknown to th actors themselves. Truly he may be said to have "anat mized" man and shown "what breeds about his heart The spectacle he offers us is, it may be admitted, decided gloomy, and by no means gratifying to human pride; bu on the other hand, La Rochefoucauld is very far from d nying, as has been represented, the reality of virtue. Se eral of the maxims show a complete recognition of i existence, and indeed a desire that it should be freed fro the odium created by the pretenders that usurp its nam The precise amount of truth which is allowed to be fou in the maxims will perhaps always vary with the expe ence or the feelings of individual readers: but it may remarked as strange, that any general denunciations of th depravity of human nature are almost always tacitly, if n readily, acquiesced in; but when this principle comes be applied to particular actions, it is indignantly scoute The Scriptures have laid down that the heart of man "deceitful and desperately wicked;" the Church, that "m is far gone from original righteousness and has no streng of himself to turn to good works;" and that "not only all just works, but even all holy desires, and all good cou sels, proceed from God." Moralists as well as theologia have been earnest in urging this point, and would appe to have been successful, at least in theory; but when author like La Rochefoucauld attempts to elicit the sar principle from a subtle and penetrating analysis of hum actions, the world seems to shrink from the practical app cation of the theory it had approved. The reason appea to be, that a general statement of a principle, as it concer

no one in particular, comes home to no one more than another; but a close and searching scrutiny, like that of the maxims, into the motives of particular actions, must raise an uncomfortable sensation in every breast, which is thus made to feel its own failings. As has been acutely observed, the cause of La Rochefoucauld's unpopularity as a moralist is that *he has told every one's secret.* Men have a direct interest in maintaining appearances; if they have not the virtue, they at least may "assume it," and they are naturally irritated at the dissipation of those delusions which facilitated the assumption.

It might with more speciousness be objected to the maxims that they are contrary in their tendency to the spirit of that charity which "thinketh no evil, believeth all things, and hopeth all things;" that we should be more ready to assign an action, if possible, to a good, than an evil motive, and that the low opinion of our fellow-men which we may acquire from La Rochefoucauld's observations, only tends to render our own tempers misanthropic and morose, without in any way conducing to practical morality. There may certainly appear some want of charity in any attempt to throw discredit on the motives of an action; but in practice it will be found that every well-constituted mind, in proportion as it becomes more sensible of the numerous and inherent failings of human nature, is more and more willing to make allowance for weaknesses it knows to be so difficult to remedy, for temptations which it feels are so hard to struggle with; and no longer thirsting for impracticable perfection, will show a sincerer sympathy for the sins and errors of its fellow-mortals. To quote La Bruyère again: "Rien n'engage tant un esprit raisonnable à supporter tranquillement des parens et des amis les torts qu'ils ont à son égard, que la réflexion qu'il

fait sur les vices de l'humanité, et combien il est pénib aux hommes d'être constans, généreux, fidèles, d'être touch d'une amitié plus forte que leur intérêt. Comme il conn leur portée, il n'exige point d'eux qu'ils pénètrent les cor qu'ils volent dans l'air, qu'ils aient de l'équité. Il peut h les hommes en général, où il y a si peu de vertu; mais excuse les particuliers, il les aime même par des mot plus relevés, et il s'étudie à mériter le moins qu'il se pe une pareille indulgence."* It might be sufficient, therefo to say that the maxims are only uncharitable in appearanc but that, in reality, by increasing our knowledge of hum nature, they tend to render us more indulgent to hum weakness; that, however charity may suffer in theory fro a low idea being entertained of human nature, it gains i finitely in practice from the avoidance of that soured a despairing temper which is caused by the reaction fro overstrained hopes and enthusiastic imaginations of goo but it may be further remarked, that whoever uses t maxims merely for the object of making uncharita remarks on the conduct of others, has studied them little purpose. It is his own heart that they should tea him most to reflect upon. In his preface to the edition 1665, Segrais says,—"The best method that the reader c adopt, is at once to be convinced that not one of the m ims is applicable to himself in particular, and that he alo is excepted, although they appear to be generally appli ble; then I will answer for it, he will be one of the first

* "He whose opinion of mankind is not too elevated, will alwa be the most benevolent, because the most indulgent to the errors cidental to human perfection; to place our nature in too flattering view is only to court disappointment and end in misanthropy."—Bu WER LYTTON.

subscribe to their correctness, and to reflect credit on the human heart." The recommendation contained in this remark, may be sufficiently palatable to disguise the sneer which it involves; but it would seem more honest, and in the end more salutary, to reverse the advice, and to recommend the reader to consider each maxim as applicable to himself only, and in no way to his neighbors. He will thus avoid any breaches of charity, and be led to the true utility of the maxims, namely, the aid they give to the extirpation of the dangerous habit of self-deceit, the habit of all others the most fatal to virtue. They can hardly fail to open the eyes of men to the various and singular modes in which self-delusion operates, the readiness with which it glosses over error, the acuteness with which it discovers excuses applicable only to itself, nay, the perverse subtlety with which it would palm off its very errors as instances of virtue. No man who is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the maxims, can pretend to that degree of mental obliquity which looks for illustrations of their working solely in the conduct of others.

Should it still be considered that La Rochefoucauld presents us with too low a view of human nature to serve the purposes of morality, it should be remembered, in his defence as an author, that the times in which he lived, and the political and moral state of the society of his day, are known to have closely corresponded with the general picture he has offered us, and in this respect may be said to afford him a complete justification.* Another circumstance for

* The writer whom La Rochefoucauld most frequently reminds us of is Tacitus, and this coincidence may suggest a strong similarity in the state of society at the respective periods which the two authors had in view.

which due allowance should be made, has been already hinted at, namely, that the mode of composition in detached maxims, to be at all effective, requires a generality of expression greater than is strictly warranted by reason, or is perhaps, really intended by the author. Neither is it fair, as before remarked, to charge La Rochefoucauld with any deliberate system of vilifying human nature, or with any theory destructive to morality. Like Montaigne, he might plead, that he was not so much an instructor as an observer:—"Others form man; I only report him."

Controversy apart, there are many of the "Maxims," the profundity of which will at once be admitted, and which have been enrolled as axioms in moral science; and of all it may be safely pronounced, that there is sufficient truth in them to make the work of the utmost value in its true character,—that of a record of moral observations not so much in themselves representing a theory of morals as hereafter to be used as the basis of new discoveries, and in the end of a scientific moral system. "As young men," to use the words of Bacon, "when they knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a further stature, so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, is in growth; but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may, perchance, be further polished and illustrated and accommodated for use and practice, but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance."

PORTRAIT

OF

THE DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD,

DRAWN BY HIMSELF.

(First Published in 1658.)

I AM of a middling size, active and well proportioned. My complexion is dark, but sufficiently uniform; forehead high and tolerably large; eyes black, small and deep set, and eyebrows black and thick, but well arched. I should have some difficulty in describing my nose, for it is neither flat, aquiline, large, nor pointed; at least, I think not: as far as I know, it is rather large than small, and extends a trifle too low. My mouth is large; the lips sufficiently red in general, and neither well nor badly shaped. My teeth are white and tolerably even. I have been sometimes told that I have rather too much chin. I have just been examining myself in the glass to ascertain the fact; and I have not been able to make up my mind about it. As to the shape of my face, it is either square or oval; but which, it would be very difficult for me to say. My hair is black, curling naturally, and, moreover, thick enough and long enough to give me some pretensions to a fine head. In my countenance there is something sorrowful and proud, which gives many people an idea that I am contemptuous, although I am far from being so. My gestures are easy, indeed rather too much so; producing a great degree of action in discourse.

This, I confess candidly, is what I think of my outwa man; and what I have said of myself will not, I consid be found different from the reality. I shall endeavor finish my portrait with the same fidelity; for I have studi myself sufficiently to be well acquainted with myself, an shall not want assurance enough to speak openly of a good qualities I may have, nor sincerity enough frankly acknowledge my faults. First, then, as to my temper am of a melancholy cast; so much so that, in the cou of three or four years, I have not been seen to laugh abc three or four times. It seems to me, however, that a melancholy would be quite supportable, and even agreeal if it only proceeded from my constitution; but there so many other causes which fill my imagination w strange ideas, and take possession of my mind in so sin lar a manner, that the greater part of my time I remain a kind of dream, without uttering a syllable, or else I tach no meaning to what I do say. I am very reser with strangers; and I am not extremely open even w the generality of those I do know. It is a fault, I ackno edge; and I will do every thing to correct it. But, a certain sombre cast of countenance contributes to make seem more reserved than I really am, and as it is not our power to get rid of a disagreeable look proceeding fr the natural disposition of the features, I conceive that, ev after I shall have corrected myself within, the same l marks will, nevertheless, be always apparent outside.

I am clever; and I make no scruple of declaring it; why should I be delicate thereon? Going about the b and softening down so much the assertion of the qualit we possess is, in my way of thinking, hiding a little van under the mask of modesty, and slyly endeavoring to m ourselves appear to have more merit than the world

given us credit for. For my part, I am perfectly satisfied to be thought not handsomer than I make myself, nor of a better humor than I paint myself, nor more clever and accomplished than I am. I therefore repeat that I am clever, but my capacities are spoilt by melancholy; for, although I know my own language passably well, although I have a retentive memory and a flow of ideas not very confused, I am, nevertheless, so absorbed by my melancholy, that I often express very badly what I wish to say.

To converse with sensible people is one of the greatest pleasures I experience. I prefer it, however, when serious and consisting chiefly of morality. I have no objection, notwithstanding, to lively subjects; and if I do not joke much, it is not because I do not know how to estimate trifles well said, or do not find highly amusing the sprightly sallies in which certain ready-witted persons excel. I write well in prose; I do well in verse; and if I were captivated by the glory which comes from this quarter, I think I might, with little labor, acquire a tolerable reputation. I am fond of general reading; but I prefer that which tends to cultivate the mind and fortify the soul. Above all, I delight in reading with a person of good understanding; for then we reflect at every instant on what we read, and from these reflections arises a conversation of the most agreeable and useful kind. I am a pretty good judge of works in prose and verse which are submitted to me; but I am apt to give my opinion of them too freely. One of my defects also is, that sometimes I am too scrupulously delicate and too critically severe. I am not averse to disputation, and I often willingly join in it; but I support my opinions with too much warmth; and when an unjust side is defended against me, I sometimes get so enthusiastic in the cause of reason, that I become almost unreasonable myself.

I possess virtuous sentiments, excellent inclinations, and so great a desire to be a perfectly good man, that my friends cannot do me a greater favor than telling me candidly of my faults. Those who know me rather particularly, and who sometimes have the goodness to give me their advice, know that I have always received it with all imaginable pleasure, and with all the submission that could be desired. All my passions are moderate and pretty well regulated: I am scarcely ever seen in anger; and I never conceived hatred to any one. I am not, however, incapable of avenging myself if I am offended, or if my honor required that I should resent an insult; on the contrary, I am certain that duty would so well supply the place of hatred, that I should pursue my revenge with more vigor than other men.

Ambition does not trouble me. I fear but few things, and death not at all. I am not very sensible of pity; and I should wish not to be so at all. Notwithstanding, I would do every thing in my power to comfort a person in distress: and I think, in fact, that one should do every thing for him, even to showing much compassion for his affliction; for miserable people are such fools, that it is this which does them the greatest good in the world: but at the same time I hold that we should only affect compassion, and carefully avoid having any; it is a passion that is perfectly useless in a well constituted mind, serving but to weaken the heart, and being only fit for common people, who, never acting by the rules of reason, are in want of passions to stimulate them to action.* I love my

* This is altogether the Stoical doctrine of pity; indeed, La Rochefoucauld appears to have had in his mind the following passage from Epictetus:—

*Ὅταν κλαίοντα ἴδῃς τινὰ ἐν πένθει, ἢ ἀποδημοῦντος τέκνου, ἢ ἀπο-

friends; and I love them in so great a degree, that I would not hesitate a moment to sacrifice my own interests to theirs. I am complaisant towards them; I put up patiently with their ill humors; but I never take much pains to please them when they visit me, and I am never much disquieted at their absence. I have naturally very little curiosity about the greater part of what excites it in others. I am very close; and have less difficulty than others in not revealing what has been told me in confidence. I am rigidly observant of my word; and I would never fail to keep my promises at any sacrifice: and this has been my constant rule through life.

I observe the most punctilious civility towards women; and I believe I never uttered a syllable in their presence which could give them a moment's pain. When they are endowed with mind, I like their conversation better than that of men: there is a certain sweetness about it which is not to be found among ourselves; and besides, they appear to me to express themselves more distinctly, and give a more agreeable turn to every thing they say. As to gallantry, I formerly practised it: at present, young as I am, I think no more of it. I have given up flirtations; and I only wonder that there are so many sensible people who can occupy their time with them. I extremely approve of the *belles passions;* they exhibit greatness of mind; and although in the inquietudes they produce there is something

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λωλεκότος τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, πρόσεχε, μή σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ, ὡς ἐν κακοῖς ὄντος αὐτοῦ, τοῖς ἐκτός· ἀλλ' εὐθὺς διαίρει παρὰ σεαυτῷ, καὶ λέγειν ἔστω πρόχειρον, ὅτι, τοῦτον θλίβει οὐ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς [ἄλλον γὰρ οὐ θλίβει] ἄλλα τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τούτου· μέχρι μέν τοι λόγου μὴ ὄκνει συμπεριφέρεσθαι αὐτῷ, κἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, συνεπιστενάξαι. Πρόσεχε μέν τοι, μὴ καὶ ἔσωθεν συνεπιστενάξῃς.—Epicteti *Enchiridion*, cap. xxii.

opposed to the strict rule of wisdom, yet they accommodate themselves so well to the most austere virtue, that I conceive it would be unjust to condemn them. Having experienced all that was delicate and forcible in exalted sentiments of love, if ever I should fall in love, I believe it would be in that way, but according to my present way of thinking, I am of opinion that the knowledge which I possess of these matters will never pass from the head to the heart.

CHARACTER

OF

THE DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD,

BY CARDINAL DE RETZ.

(From De Retz's Mémoires.)

THERE was always something incomprehensible in the whole character of M. de la Rochefoucauld. He was fond of being mixed up with intrigues even from his childhood; a time when he could not discern petty interests, which, indeed, have never being his failing, nor comprehend greater ones, which, in another sense, have never being his strong point. He was never capable of carrying on any affair; and I know not why, for he possessed qualities which, in every one else, would have supplied the place of those he wanted. His discernment was not extensive; and he could not even take in at once the whole of what was within his range: but his good sense, excellent in theory, united to his gentleness of character, to his insinuating address, and to an admirable ease of manners, ought to have made more amends than it did for his want of penetration. He had always an irresolution, which was habitual to him; but I do not even know to what to attribute this irresolution. I cannot assign it to the fertility of his imagination, which was any thing but lively. I cannot assign it to the sterility of his judgment; for though not happy in working it out, he had a good store of reason. We see the effects of this irresolution, although we know not the cause.

He was never a general, though an excellent soldier. He was never of himself a good courtier, though he always had a great mind to become one. He was never a good partisan, though his whole life has been spent as such. That air of bashfulness and timidity which he has in society, becomes in business apologetic. He always fancied he had need of it; and this circumstance, together with his "Maxims," which do not exhibit sufficient faith in virtue, and his practice of always quitting an affair with as much impatience as he had entered into it, makes me conclude that he would have done better to have become acquainted with his own character, and to have been content to pass, as he might have done, for the most accomplished courtier, and the most amiable man in private life, that had appeared in his age.

CHARACTER

OF

THE CARDINAL DE RETZ,

BY THE DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD.

(From Madame de Sevigné's Letters.)

PAUL DE GONDI CARDINAL DE RETZ possesses great elevation of character, a certain extent of intellect, and more of the ostentation than of the true greatness of courage. He has an extraordinary memory, more energy than polish in his words, an easy humor, docility of character, and weakness in submitting to the complaints and reproaches of his friends, a little piety, some appearances of religion. He appears ambitious without being really so; vanity and those who have guided him have made him undertake great things, almost all opposed to his profession. He excited the greatest troubles in the state, without any design of turning them to account; and, far from declaring himself the enemy of Cardinal Mazarin with any view of occupying his place, he thought of nothing but making himself an object of dread to him, and flattering himself with the false vanity of being his opponent. He was clever enough, however, to take advantage of the public calamities to get himself made cardinal: he endured his imprisonment with firmness, and owed his liberty solely to his own daring. In the obscurity of a life of wandering and concealment, his indolence for many years supported him with reputation: he preserved the archbishopric of Paris against the power

of Cardinal Mazarin; but, after the death of that minist he resigned it, without knowing what he was doing, a without making use of the opportunity to promote the i terests of himself and his friends. He has taken part several conclaves, and his conduct has always increased l reputation.

His natural bent is to indolence; nevertheless, he labo with activity in pressing business, and reposes with indiff ence when it is concluded. He has great presence of min and knows so well how to turn it to his own advantage all the occasions presented him by fortune, that it wou seem as if he had foreseen and desired them. He loves narrate, and seeks to dazzle all his listeners indifferent by his extraordinary adventures; and his imagination oft supplies him with more than his memory. The generali of his qualities are false; and what has most contribut to his reputation is his power of throwing a good light his faults. He is insensible alike to hatred and to frien ship, whatever pains he may be at to appear taken up w the one or the other. He is incapable of envy or of avari whether from virtue or from carelessness. He has b rowed more from his friends than a private person cou ever hope to be able to repay;—he has felt the vanity acquiring so much on credit, and of undertaking to dischar it. He has neither taste nor refinement; he is amused l every thing, and pleased by nothing. He avoids, with co siderable address, allowing people to penetrate the slig acquaintance he has with every thing. The retreat he h just made from the world, is the most brilliant, and t most unreal action of his life; it is a sacrifice he has ma to his pride under pretence of devotion—he quits the cou to which he cannot attach himself; and retires from world, which is retiring from him.

MORAL REFLECTIONS, SENTENCES, AND MAXIMS.

1.

SELF-LOVE is the love of one's self, and of every thing on account of one's self; it makes men idolize themselves, and would make them tyrants over others if fortune were to give them the means. It never reposes out of itself, and only settles on strange objects, as bees do on flowers, to extract what is useful to it. There is nothing so impetuous as its desires, nothing so secret as its plans, nothing so clever as its conduct. Its pliancy cannot be depicted, its transformations surpass those of Ovid's "Metamorphoses," its refinements those of chemistry. We cannot sound the depths, nor penetrate the darkness of its abysses. There it is concealed from the keenest eyes, it goes through a thousand turns and changes. There it is often invisible to itself; it conceives, nourishes, and brings up, without being conscious of it, a

vast number of loves and hates. Some of thes it forms so monstrous, that when brought t light it is unable to recognize them, or canno resolve to own them. From this darknes which conceals it, spring the ridiculous ideas i has of itself; hence come its errors, its ignc rances, its grossness, and its follies with respec to itself. Hence it comes that it fancies it sentiments dead when they are only asleep, i thinks that it has no desire to arise from its re pose, and believes that it has lost the appetite which it has satiated. But this thick darknes which conceals it from itself does not preven its seeing perfectly every external object—i this, resembling our eyes, which see every thing and are only blind to themselves; in fact, i its greatest interests and in its most importan affairs, where the violence of its desires call fc all its attention, it sees, it perceives, it unde stands, it imagines, it suspects, it penetrates, i divines every thing; so much so, that one tempted to believe that each of our passions ha a magic peculiar to itself. Nothing is so clos and so firm as its attachments, which it vainl endeavors to break off at the appearance of th extreme evils which menace it. Sometime however, it accomplishes in a short time, an without effort, what it had not been able t

effect in the course of several years with all the efforts in its power; whence we may conclude, not unjustly, that its desires are excited by itself, rather than by the beauty and the merit of their objects; that its own taste is the price which gives them value, and the cosmetic which sets them off; that it is only itself which it pursues, and that it follows its own taste when it follows things after its taste. It is a compound of contraries, it is imperious and obedient, sincere and dissembling, compassionate and cruel, timid and daring; it has various inclinations according to the various temperaments which affect it, and devote it, sometimes to glory, sometimes to riches, and sometimes to pleasure; it changes them according to the changes of our age, our fortune, and our experience. It is indifferent to it, whether it has many inclinations, or only one, because it shares itself among many, or collects itself into one as may be necessary or agreeable to it. It is inconstant, and, besides the changes which arise from external causes, there are an infinity which spring from itself, and from its own resources. It is inconstant from inconstancy, from levity, from love, from novelty, from weariness, from disgust. It is capricious, and we sometimes see it laboring with extreme

earnestness and with incredible toil, to obtain things which are by no means advantageous, and even hurtful to it, but which it pursues because it wills to have them. It is whimsical, and often throws its whole application into the most frivolous pursuits; it finds its whole delight in the most insipid, and preserves all its pride in the most contemptible. It is present to all states and in all conditions of life; it lives everywhere, it lives on every thing, it lives on nothing. It accommodates itself to advantages, and to the deprivation of them; it even goes over to the side of those who are at war with it; it enters into their schemes, and, what is wonderful, it joins them in hating itself, it conspires its own destruction, it labors for its own ruin. In short, it cares for nothing but its own existence, and, provided that it do exist, will readily become its own enemy. We must not be surprised, therefore, if it unites with the most rigid austerity, and enters boldly into league with it to work its own destruction, because, at the same time that it is overthrowing itself in one place it is re-establishing itself in another. When we suppose that it is relinquishing its pleasures, it does nothing but suspend or vary them; and even when defeated, and supposed to be annihilated, we find it tri-

umphing in its own defeat. This is the picture of self-love, the whole existence of which is nothing but one long and mighty agitation. The sea is a sensible image of it, and self-love finds in the ebb and flow of the waves a faithful representation of the turbulent succession of its thoughts, and of its ceaseless movements.

2.

What we take for virtues is often nothing but an assemblage of different actions, and of different interests, that fortune or our industry know how to arrange; and it is not always from valor and from chastity that men are valiant, and that women are chaste.

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2. "Not always actions show the man: we find
Who does a kindness is not therefore kind;
Perhaps prosperity becalmed his breast;
Perhaps the wind just shifted from the East:
Not therefore humble he who seeks retreat,
Pride guides his steps, and bids him shun the great.
Who combats bravely, is not therefore brave,
He dreads a death-bed like the meanest slave.
Who reasons wisely, is not therefore wise;
His pride in reasoning, not in acting, lies."

POPE, *Moral Essays*, Epistle 1. 109.

3.

Self-love is the greatest of all flatterers.

4.

Whatever discoveries may have been made in the territory of self-love, there still remain in it many unknown tracts.

5.

Self-love is more artful than the most artful man in the world.

6.

The duration of our passions no more depends on ourselves than the duration of our lives.

7.

Passion often makes a madman of the cleverest man, and renders the greatest fools clever.

8.

Those great and brilliant actions which daz-

3. "It hath been well said that the arch flatterer, with whom all the petty flatterers have intelligence, is a man's self."—Bacon, *Essay* 10.

zle our eyes, are represented by politicians as the effects of great designs, instead of which they are commonly the effects of caprice and of the passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, which is attributed to the ambition they had of making themselves masters of the world, was, perhaps, nothing but a result of jealousy.

9.

The passions are the only orators that always persuade: they are, as it were, a natural art, the rules of which are infallible; and the simplest man with passion, is more persuasive than the most eloquent, without it.

10.

The passions have an injustice and an interest of their own, which renders it dangerous to obey them, and we ought to mistrust them even when they appear most reasonable.

11.

There is going on in the human heart a perpetual generation of passions, so that the overthrow of one is almost always the establishment of another.

12.

The passions often engender their contraries; avarice sometimes produces prodigality, and prodigality avarice; we are often resolute from weakness, and daring from timidity.

13.

Whatever pains we may take to disguise our passions under the appearances of piety and honor, they always discover themselves through these veils.

14.

Our self-love endures with greater impatience the condemnation of our tastes, than of our opinions.

15.

Men are not only prone to lose the remembrance of benefits and of injuries; they even hate those who have obliged them, and cease to hate those who have grievously injured them. The constant study to recompense good and avenge evil appears to them a slavery, to which they feel it difficult to submit.

16.

The clemency of princes is often only a

stroke of policy to gain the affections of their people.

17.

This clemency, of which men make a virtue, is practised sometimes from vanity, sometimes from indolence, often from fear, and almost always from all three together.

18.

The moderation of fortunate people comes from the calm which good fortune gives to their tempers.

19.

Moderation is a fear of falling into envy, and into the contempt which those deserve who become intoxicated with their good fortune; it is a vain ostentation of the strength of our mind; in short, the moderation of men in their highest elevation is a desire of appearing greater than their fortune.

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19. Tacitus notices of Piso, on his elevation to the empire by Galba: "Nihil in vultu habituque mutatum; quasi imperare posset magis, quam vellet."—*Hist.* i. 17.

20.

We have all of us sufficient fortitude to bear the misfortunes of others.

21.

The constancy of sages is nothing but the art of locking up their agitation in their hearts.

22.

Those who are condemned to be executed

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20. "Every man can master a grief, but he that has it."—*Much Ado about Nothing*, Act iii. Scene 2.

"Men
Can counsel and speak comfort to that grief,
Which they themselves not feel, but tasting it
Their counsel turns to passion.

* * * *

No, no! 'Tis all men's office to speak patience
To those that wring under the load of sorrow.
But no man's virtue nor sufficiency,
To be so moral, when he shall endure
The like himself."

Much Ado about Nothing, Act v. Scene 1.

Swift was not above adopting this maxim as his own. "I never knew a man who could not bear the misfortunes of others with the most Christian resignation."—*Thoughts on Various Subjects.*

22. "The poor wretches that we see brought to the place of execution, full of ardent devotion, and therein, as much

affect sometimes a firmness and a contempt of death, which is, in fact, only the fear of looking it in the face; so that it may be said that this firmness, and this contempt, are to their minds what the bandage is to their eyes.

23.

Philosophy triumphs easily over past, and over future evils, but present evils triumph over philosophy.

24.

Few people know what death is. We seldom suffer it from resolution, but from stupidity

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as in them lies, employing all their senses,—their ears in hearing the instructions that are given them,—their eyes and hands lifted up towards heaven,—their voices in loud prayers, with a vehement and continual emotion, do doubtless things very commendable and proper for such a necessity: we ought to commend them for their devotion, but not properly for their constancy; they shun the encounter, they divert their thoughts from the consideration of death, as children are amused with some toy or other, when the surgeon is going to give them a prick with his lancet."—MONTAIGNE, b. iii. c. 4. (Cotton's Translation.)

23. This sentiment has been expressed in a homely, but perhaps more forcible way by Goldsmith, in *The Good-natured Man*. "This same philosophy is a good horse in a stable, but an arrant jade on a journey."

and from habit; and the generality of men die because they cannot help dying.

25.

When great men suffer themselves to be overcome by the length of their misfortunes, they let us see that they only supported them through the strength of their ambition, not through that of their minds; and that, with the exception of a good deal of vanity, heroes are made just like other men.

26.

It requires greater virtues to support good, than bad fortune.

27.

Neither the sun nor death can be looked at steadily.

"There was never yet philosopher
That could endure the tooth-ache patiently,
However they have writ the style of gods,
And made a push at chance and sufferance."

Much Ado about Nothing, Act v. Scene 1.

26. "Fortunam adhuc tantum adversam tulisti; secundæ res acrioribus stimulis animos explorant, quia miseriæ tolerantur, felicitate corrumpimur."—Tac. *Hist.* i. 15.

"Prosperity doth best discover vice, but adversity doth best discover virtue."—Bacon, *Essay on Adversity.*

28.

We often make a parade of passions, even of the most criminal; but envy is a timid and shameful passion which we never dare to avow.

29.

Jealousy is in some sort just and reasonable, since it only has for its object the preservation of a good which belongs, or which we fancy belongs to ourselves, while envy, on the contrary, is a madness which cannot endure the good of others.

30.

The evil which we commit does not draw

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28. "I don't believe that there is a human creature in his senses, arrived to maturity, that at some time or other has not been carried away by this passion, (sc. envy,) in good earnest; and yet I never met with any one who dared own he was guilty of it but in jest."—MANDEVILLE, *Fable of the Bees*, Remark N.

"Many men profess to hate another, but no man owns envy, as being an enmity or displeasure for no cause but goodness or felicity."—JER. TAYLOR, *Holy Living*.

30. "L'on me dit tant de mal de cet homme, et j'y en vois si peu que je commence à soupçonner qu'il n'ait qu'un mérite importun qui éteigne celui des autres."—LA BRUYERE, *De la Cour*.

down on us so much hatred and persecution as our good qualities.

31.

We have more power than will; and it is often by way of excuse to ourselves that we fancy things are impossible.

32.

If we had no faults ourselves, we should not take so much pleasure in remarking them in others.

33.

Jealousy lives upon doubts—it becomes madness, or ceases entirely, as soon as we pass from doubt to certainty.

34.

Pride always compensates itself, and loses nothing, even when it renounces vanity.

35.

If we had no pride ourselves, we should not complain of that of others.

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34. "Whoever desires the character of a proud man ought to conceal his vanity."—SWIFT, *Thoughts on Various Subjects.*

35. "The proud are ever most provoked by pride."
COWPER, *Conversation.*

36.

Pride is equal in all men; and the only difference is in the means and manner of displaying it.

37.

It seems that Nature, which has so wisely disposed our bodily organs with a view to our happiness, has also bestowed on us pride, to spare us the pain of being aware of our imperfections.

38.

Pride has a greater share than goodness of heart in the remonstrances we make to those who are guilty of faults; we reprove not so much with a view to correct them as to persuade them that we are exempt from those faults ourselves.

"Men are sometimes accused of pride merely because their accusers would be proud themselves if they were in their places."—SHENSTONE, *Men and Manners.*

37. "See some strange comfort every state attend,
And pride bestow'd on all, a common friend."
POPE, *Essay on Man*, Ep. 2, 271.

39.

We promise according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears.

40.

Interest speaks all sorts of languages, and plays all sorts of parts, even that of disinterestedness.

41.

Interest, which blinds some, opens the eyes of others.

42.

Those who bestow too much application on

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42. "Frivolous curiosity about trifles, and laborious attention to little objects which neither require nor deserve a moment's thought, lower a man, who from thence is thought (and not unjustly) incapable of greater matters. Cardinal de Retz very sagaciously marked out Cardinal Chigi for a little mind, from the moment he told him that he had wrote three years with the same pen, and that it was an excellent good one still."—Lord Chesterfield.

"Never get a reputation for a small perfection, if you are trying for fame in a loftier area; the world can only judge by generals, and it sees that those who pay considerable attention to minutiæ, seldom have their minds occupied with great things. There are, it is true, exceptions; but to exceptions the world does not attend."—Bulwer Lytton.

trifling things, become generally incapable of great ones.

43.

We have not strength enough to follow all our reason.

44.

A man often fancies that he guides himself when he is guided by others; and while his mind aims at one object, his heart insensibly draws him on to another.

45.

Strength and weakness of mind are badly named—they are, in fact, nothing more than the good or bad arrangement of the organs of the body.

46.

The capriciousness of our humor is often more fantastical than that of fortune.

47.

The attachment or indifference which the philosophers had for life was nothing more than one of the tastes of their self-love, which we ought no more to dispute than the taste of the palate, or the choice of colors.

48.

Our humor sets its price on every thing we get from fortune.

49.

Happiness lies in the taste, and not in the things; and it is from having what we desire that we are happy—not from having what others think desirable.

50.

We are never so happy, or so unhappy, as we imagine.

51.

Men who fancy they have merit, take a

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49. "Every one is well or ill at ease, according as he finds himself: not he whom the world believes, but he who believes himself to be so, is content, and therein alone belief gives itself being and reality. Fortune does us neither good nor hurt; she only presents us the matter and the seed, which our soul, more powerful than she, turns and applies as she best pleases, being the sole cause and sovereign mistress of her own happy or unhappy condition. All external accessions receive taste and color from the internal constitution, as clothes warm us not with their heat but our own, which they are adapted to cover and keep in."—Montaigne, b. i. ch. 40.

51. "Persecution to persons in a high rank stands them in the stead of eminent virtue."—De Retz.

pride in being unfortunate, to persuade others and themselves that they are worthy to be the butt of fortune.

52.

Nothing ought so much to diminish the good opinion we have of ourselves as to see that we disapprove at one time what we approve at another.

53.

Whatever may be the apparent difference between fortunes, there is a certain compensation of good and evil which renders them equal.

54.

However great the advantages which Nature bestows on us, it is not she alone, but Fortune in conjunction with her, which makes heroes.

Dogberry, in the enumeration of his merits, tells us that he is "a rich fellow enough, go to; and a fellow that hath had *losses*."—*Much Ado about Nothing*, Act iv. Scene 2. See also Scott's Introduction to *Quentin Durward*, where Dogberry's remark is discussed.

54. "In analyzing the character of heroes, it is hardly possible to separate altogether the share of fortune from their own."—HALLAM.

55.

The contempt of riches among the philosophers was a hidden desire to revenge their merit for the injustice of Fortune, by contempt of the very advantages of which she deprived them. It was a secret to secure themselves from the degradation of poverty: it was a by-road to arrive at that consideration which they could not obtain by riches.

56.

Hatred of favorites is nothing else than the love of favor. The mortification of not possessing it, is consoled and relieved by the contempt we show of those who do possess it; and we refuse them our respect, because we cannot deprive them of what attracts the respect of all the world.

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55. This will remind the reader of one of Gibbon's sneers. "It is always easy, as well as agreeable, for the inferior ranks of mankind to claim a merit from the contempt of that pomp and pleasure which fortune has placed beyond their reach. The virtue of the primitive Christians, like that of the first Romans, was very frequently guarded by poverty and ignorance."—*Decline and Fall*, cap. 15.

"Since we cannot attain to greatness, let us revenge ourselves by railing at it."—MONTAIGNE, b. iii. c. 7.

57.

In order to establish themselves in the world, men do all they can to appear established there.

58.

Although men pride themselves on their great actions, these are often the result, not of any great design, but of chance.

59.

It would seem that our actions are regulated by lucky or unlucky stars, to which they owe a great part of the praise or blame bestowed on them.

60.

There are no circumstances, however unfortunate, that clever people do not extract some

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57. "If a man wishes to become rich, he must appear to be rich."—GOLDSMITH.

According to Juvenal, the Roman lawyers had a thorough appreciation of this truth:—

"Respicit hæc primum, qui litigat, an tibi servi
Octo, decem comites, an post te sella, togati
Ante pedes. Ideo conductâ Paulus agebat
Sardonyche, atque ideo pluris quam Cossus agebat,
Quam Basilus." *Sat.* vii. 141.

advantage from; and none, however fortunate, that the imprudent cannot turn to their own prejudice.

61.

Fortune turns every thing to the advantage of her favorites.

62.

The happiness or unhappiness of men depends as much on their humors as on fortune.

63.

Sincerity is an opening of the heart: we find it in very few people; and that which we generally see is nothing but a subtle dissimulation to attract the confidence of others.

64.

Aversion to lying is often an imperceptible

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61. "Aderat (Cereali) fortuna etiam ubi artes defuissent."—TACITUS, *Hist.* v. c. 21.

62. "Satis est orare Jovem quæ donat et aufert,
Det vitam, det opes, æquum animum mî ipse parabo."
HOR. *Epist.* i. 18, 111.

63. "C'est toujours un mauvais moyen de lire dans le cœur des autres, que d'affecter de cacher le sein."—ROUSSEAU, *Conf.* l. 2.

desire to render our testimony important, and to give a religious aspect to our words.

65.

Truth does not do so much good in the world as its appearances do evil.

66.

There is no kind of praise which has not been bestowed on prudence; nevertheless, however great it may be, it cannot assure us of the least event, because its subject is man —the most changeable in the world.

67.

A clever man should regulate his interests, and place them in proper order. Our avidity often deranges them by inducing us to undertake too many things at once; and by grasping at minor objects, we lose our hold of more important ones.

68.

Grace is to the body what good sense is to the mind.

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65. This thought is inserted by Talleyrand in his *Maxims for Seasoning Conversation.* See his Reminiscences, by M. Colmache.

69.

It is difficult to define love. All that we can say of it is, that in the soul it is a passion for reigning; in minds it is a sympathy; and in the body it is nothing but a latent and delicate desire to possess the loved object, after a good deal of mystery.

70.

If there exists a love pure and exempt from the mixture of our other passions, it is that which lies hidden at the bottom of the heart, and of which we are ignorant ourselves.

71.

There is no disguise which can long conceal love where it does, or feign it where it does not, exist.

72.

As it never depends on ourselves to love, or

70. "Genuine love, however rated as the chief passion of the human heart, is but a poor dependant, a retainer upon other passions,—admiration, gratitude, respect, esteem pride in the object. Divest the boasted sensation of these and it is no more than the impression of a twelvemonth by courtesy or vulgar error termed love."—Mrs. Inchbald *Nature and Art.*

to cease to love, a lover cannot complain with justice of the inconstancy of his mistress, nor she of her lover's fickleness.

73.

If we judge of love by the generality of its effects, it resembles hatred rather than friendship.

74.

It is possible to meet with women who have never had an affair of gallantry; but it is rare to find any one who have had only one.

75.

There is only one sort of love, but a thousand different copies of it.

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72. "L'on n'est pas plus le maître de toujours aimer, qu'on ne l'a été de ne pas aimer."—La Bruyere, *du Cœur.*

74. "Writing grows a habit, like a woman's gallantry: there are women who have had no intrigue, but few who have had but one only; so there are millions of men who have never written a book, but few who have written only one."—Byron, *Observations on an Article in Blackwood's Magazine.* And again:—

"Yet there are some, they say, who have had none,
But those who have, ne'er end with only one."

Don Juan, iii. st. 4.

76.

Love, like fire, cannot subsist without continual movement; as soon as it ceases to hope and fear, it ceases to exist.

77.

Love lends its name to an infinite number of connections which are attributed to it, and in which it has no more part than the Doge has in what goes on at Venice.

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76. "Like chiefs of faction,
Love's life is action,
A sordid paction,
That curbs his reign,
Obscures his glory.
Despot no more, he
Such territory,
Quits with disdain.

"Still, still advancing,
With banners glancing,
His power enhancing,
He must move on;
Repose but cloys him,
Retreat destroys him,
Love brooks not a degraded throne,"—Byron.

78.

The pleasure of love is in loving. We are happier in the passion we feel than in that we excite.

79.

There are people who would never have been in love if they had never heard of love.

80.

It is with true love as with apparitions. Every one talks of it, but few have ever seen it.

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78. "Love is sweet
Given or return'd. Common as light is love,
And its familiar voice wearies not ever;
They who inspire it most are fortunate,
As I am now; but those who feel it most
Are happier still."—SHELLEY, *Prometheus Unbound.*

"It is better to desire than to enjoy, to love than to be loved."—HAZLITT, *Characteristics*, No. 205. And again, 236: "It makes us proud when our love of a mistress is returned: it ought to make us prouder still when we can love her for herself alone, without the aid of any such selfish reflection. This is the religion of love."

80. Byron was well read in La Rochefoucauld, and this maxim appears to have been the germ of the following fine stanza:—

81.

Silence is the best course for any man to adopt who distrusts himself.

82.

The reason we are so changeable in our friendships is, that it is difficult to know the qualities of the heart, while it is easy to know those of the head.

"O Love, no inhabitant of earth thou art.
An unseen seraph, we believe in thee—
A faith whose martyrs are the broken heart;
But never yet hath seen, or e'er shall see,
The naked eye thy form, as it should be.
The mind hath made thee, as it peopled heaven
Even with its own desiring fantasy.
And to a thought such shape and image given
As haunts the unquench'd soul, parch'd, wearied, wrung, and riven."—*Childe Harold*, Canto iv.

81. Πᾶς τις ἀπαίδευτος φρονιμώτατος ἔστι σιωπῶν.—PALLAD. ALEXAND. *Epig.*

"O my Antonio, I do know of these
That therefore only are reputed wise
For saying nothing."—*Merchant of Venice.*

82. "A government is inexcusable for employing foolish ministers, for they may examine a man's head, though they cannot his heart."—SHENSTONE, *Thoughts on Politics.*

83.

What men have given the name of friendship to is nothing but an alliance, a reciprocal accommodation of interests, an exchange of good offices; in fact, it is nothing but a system of traffic, in which self-love always proposes to itself some advantage.

84.

Love of justice in the generality of men is only the fear of suffering from injustice.

85.

Reconciliation with our enemies is only a desire of bettering our condition, a weariness of contest, and the fear of some disaster.

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84. "An injury done to one is a threat held out to a hundred."—Bacon, translated from Publius Syrus:—

"Multis minatur qui uni facit injuriam."

See No. 368. This thought, in the first edition, was differently expressed: "Men blame injustice, not from any aversion they have to it, but with reference to the harm they may receive from it;" for which the author afterwards substituted the present Maxim.

85. "After three obstinate and equal campaigns, John of Antioch and Cyril of Alexandria condescended to explain

86.

When we are tired of loving we are very glad of some act of infidelity towards ourselves to disengage us from our own fidelity.

87.

It is more disgraceful to distrust one's friends than to be deceived by them.

88.

We often persuade ourselves that we love people more powerful than we are; and yet it is interest alone which produces our friendship. We do not associate with them for any good that we wish to do them, but for that which we would receive from them.

89.

Our mistrust justifies the deceit of others.

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and embrace; but their seeming reunion must be imputed rather to prudence than reason, to the mutual lassitude rather than to the Christian charity of the patriarchs."—GIBBON, *Decline and Fall*, chap. 47.

89. "Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli, et aliis jus peccandi suspicando fecerunt."—SENECA, *Ep.* 3.

90.

How can we expect another to keep our secret if we cannot keep it ourselves?

Self-love increases or diminishes in our eyes the good qualities of our friends in proportion to the satisfaction we derive from them, and we judge of their merits by the kind of intercourse which they keep up with us.

92.

Every one complains of his memory, and no one complains of his judgment.

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90. This idea has been expressed by other writers, but by none more happily than by La Rochefoucauld.

"I have play'd the fool, the gross fool, to believe
The bosom of a friend would hold a secret
Mine own could not contain."

MASSINGER, *Unnatural Combat*, Act v. Sc. 2.

"Toute révélation d'un secret est la faute de celui qui l'a confié."—LA BRUYERE, *De la Société*.

"*Ham.* Do not believe it.

Rosencr. Believe what?

Ham. That I can keep your counsel, and not mine own."—SHAKSPEARE, *Hamlet*, Act iv. Sc. 2.

92. "When I complain of my memory, they seem not

93.

There are no people who are so troublesome to others as the indolent: when they have satisfied their indolence they wish to appear diligent.

94.

The greatest ambition has not the least appearance of it when it finds the absolute impossibility of reaching the height it aspires after.

95.

Great names debase, instead of elevating, those who cannot sustain them.

96.

To undeceive a man persuaded of his own merit, is to do him as ill a service as that ren-

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to believe I am in earnest, and presently reprove me as though I accused myself for a fool; not discerning the difference between memory and understanding. Wherein they are very wide of my intention, and do me wrong; experience rather daily showing us, on the contrary, that a strong memory is commonly coupled with an infirm judgment."—MONTAIGNE, book i. ch. 9.

96. This alludes to an incident related by Ælian (*Hist. Var.* book iv. ch. 25) and Athenæus (book xii.), of one

dered to the Athenian madman, who fancied that all the vessels entering the harbor belonged to him.

97.

Old men are fond of giving good advice, to console themselves for being no longer in a position to give bad examples.

98.

The mark of an extraordinary merit, is to

Thrasyllus. Horace's account of a similar delusion is well known.

"Fuit haud ignobilis Argis
Qui se credebat miros audire tragœdos,
In vacuo lætus sessor plausorque theatro.
* * * *
Hic ubi cognatorum opibus curisque refectus,
Expulit elleboro morbum bilemque meraci,
Et redit ad sese: Pol, me occidistis, amici,
Non servâstis, ait, cui sic extorta voluptas
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error."

Epist. ii. 2, 127.

Pope has parodied this anecdote in his imitations of Horace. Aristotle also relates a similar story, *Mirab. Auscult*, init.

97. "La première chose qui arrive aux hommes après avoir renoncé aux plaisirs c'est les condamner dans les autres."—La Bruyere, *De l'Homme.*

see those most envious of it constrained to praise.

99.

It is a proof of very little friendship not to notice a cooling in that of our friends.

100.

We are mistaken in supposing that intellect and judgment are two different things. Judgment is merely the greatness of the light of the mind; this light penetrates into the recesses of things; it observes there every thing remarkable, and perceives what appears to be imperceptible. Thus it must be allowed that it is the greatness of the light of the mind which produces all the effects attributed to judgment.

101.

Every one speaks well of his heart, but no one dares to do so of his head.

102.

Politeness of mind consists in the conception of honorable and delicate thoughts.

103.

Gallantry of mind consists in saying flattering things in an agreeable manner.

104.

It often happens that things present themselves to our minds in a more complete state than we could by much art make them arrive at.

105.

The head is always the dupe of the heart.

106.

It is not all who know their heads who know their hearts.

107.

Men and things have both their proper points of view. Some require to be seen near to be judged well of; others are never so well judged of as at a distance.

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105. "Quelle mésintelligence entre l'esprit et le cœur! Le philosophe vit mal avec tous ses préceptes, et le politique rempli de vues et de réflexions ne sait pas se gouverner."—La Bruyere, *De l'Homme.*

"Plusieurs diroient en période quarré, que quelques réflexions que fasse l'esprit, et quelques résolutions qu'il prenne pour corriger ses travers, le premier sentiment du cœur renverse tous ses projets. Mais il n'appartient qu'à M. de la Rochefoucauld de dire tout en un mot que 'L'esprit est toujours la dupe du cœur.'"—Bouhours, *Art de Penser.*

106. See No. 82.

108.

He is not a reasonable man who by chance stumbles upon reason; but he who derives it from knowledge, from discernment, and from taste.

109.

To know things perfectly, we should know them in detail; but as this is almost infinite, our knowledge is always superficial and imperfect.

110.

It is a species of coquetry to make a parade of never practising it.

111.

The head cannot long play the part of the heart.

112.

In youth the tastes are changed from heat of blood; in old age they are preserved from habit.

113.

We give away nothing so liberally as advice.

114.

The more we love a mistress, the nearer we are to hating her.

115.

The defects of the mind, like those of the countenance, augment with age.

116.

There are some good marriages, but none that afford many delights.

117.

We are inconsolable at being deceived by our enemies, and betrayed by our friends; and yet we are often content to be so by ourselves.

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114. Probably because excess has a tendency to produce reaction. La Bruyère observes, "Les froideurs et les relâchemens dans l'amitié ont leurs causes; en amour il n'y a guère d'autre raison de ne s'aimer plus que de s'être trop aimés."—*Du Cœur.*

"Love bears within its breast the very germ
Of change; and how should it be otherwise?
That strongest things the soonest find their term
Is shown by Nature's whole analogies."

BYRON, *Don Juan*, canto xiv. st. 94.

118.

It is as easy to deceive oneself without perceiving it, as it is difficult to deceive others without their perceiving it.

119.

Nothing is less sincere than the method of asking and giving advice. The man who asks it appears to have a respectful deference for the opinion of his friend, while he intends to make him approve of his own; and he who gives the advice repays the confidence shown in him by an ardent and disinterested zeal, though, in the advice he gives, he has generally nothing in view but his own interest or fame.

120.

The most subtle of all artifices is the power

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120. "Solum insidiarum remedium est si non intelligerentur."—Tac. *Ann.* 14, 6.

"The surest way of making a dupe is to let your victim suppose that you are his."—Bulwer Lytton.

"Vous le croyez votre dupe; s'il feint de l'être, qui est le plus dupe, de lui ou de vous?"—La Bruyere, *De la Société.*

A curious illustration of this maxim was lately exhibited

of cleverly feigning to fall into the snares laid for us; and we are never so easily deceived as when we think we are deceiving others.

121.

A determination never to deceive often exposes us to deception.

122.

We are so much accustomed to disguise ourselves to others, that at length we disguise ourselves to ourselves.

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in the events which led to the defeat of the King of Sardinia, in Lombardy, in July, 1848. He was beguiled by a pretended plot for delivering the town of Mantua into his hands, and with a view of aiding in its execution, was induced to weaken his military position to such a degree as to enable the Austrian general, Radetzky, to attack him at a disadvantage. The Italian correspondent of the *Times* Newspaper (Aug. 2d, 1848) remarks upon this: "I perceive that the whole affair was, to use a vulgar but expressive phrase, 'a plant' to induce the King to impoverish the left of our lines, where Radetzky saw, as events have since proved, that he might strike the surest blow. * * * I have often noticed that cunning men are the most easily deceived, and I fear Charles Albert, who has the reputation of being very *rusé*, has thus been caught."

123.

Men are more often guilty of treachery from weakness of character than from any settled design to betray.

124.

We often do good, in order that we may do evil with impunity.

125.

If we resist our passions it is more from their weakness than from our strength.

126.

We should have very little pleasure if we did not sometimes flatter ourselves.

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123. This is the principle which Shakspeare appears to have in view when he makes Polonius say,—

"This above all, to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."—*Hamlet.*

125. Thus Montaigne says of himself: "If I had been born of a more irregular complexion, I am afraid I should have made scurvy work on't, for I never observed any great stability in my soul to resist passions if they were never so little vehement."—*Essays*, b. ii. ch. 11.

127.

The cleverest men affect all their lives to censure all artifice, in order that they may make use of it themselves on some grand occasion, and for some great interest.

128.

The ordinary employment of artifice is the mark of a petty mind; and it almost always happens that he who uses it to cover himself in one place, uncovers himself in another.

129.

Treacheries and acts of artifice only originate in the want of ability.

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127. "Certainly the cleverest men that ever were have all had an openness and frankness of dealing, and a name of certainty and veracity, but then they were like horses well managed, for they could tell passing well when to stop or turn, and at such times, when they thought the case required dissimulation, if then they used it, it came to pass that the former opinion spread abroad of their good faith and clearness of dealing, rendered them almost invisible."—Bacon, *Essays, Simulation and Dissimulation.*

128. "We take cunning for a sinister or crooked wisdom, and certainly there is a great difference between a cunning man and a wise man, not only in point of honesty, but in point of ability."—Bacon, *Essays, Cunning.*

129. See last note. The same truth seems to be ad-

130.

The true method of being deceived is to think oneself more cunning than others.

131.

Too great refinement is false delicacy, and true delicacy is solid refinement.

132.

Coarseness is sometimes sufficient to protect us from being overreached by an artful man.

133.

Weakness of mind is the only fault incapable of correction.

134.

The least fault in women who have abandoned themselves to love is to love.

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mitted in the saying of Lysander (Plutarch in vit.)—"When the lion's skin is too short, it should be eked out with the fox's."—See Sir E. B. Lytton's *Richelieu*, Act i.

130. "Here, my sagacious friend," said Louis, "take this purse of gold, and with it the advice, never to be so great a fool as to think yourself wiser than another."—*Quentin Durward.*

134. "Faciunt graviora coactæ
Imperio sexûs, minimumque libidine peccant."
Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. 134.

135.

It is more easy to be wise for others than for ourselves.

136.

The only good copies are those which exhibit the defects of bad originals.

137.

We are never so ridiculous from the qualities we have, as from those we affect to have.

138.

We are sometimes as different from ourselves as we are from others.

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135. "Ita quæso (Dii vostram fidem!)
Itane comparatam esse hominum naturam omnium
Aliena ut melius videant et dijudicent
Quam sua! An eo fit quia in re nostrâ aut gaudio
Sumus præpediti nimio aut ægritudine?"—
TERENCE, *Heaut.* Act iii. Scene 1, ad fin.

138. "We are all unformed lumps, and of so various a contexture that every moment every piece plays its own game, and there is as much difference betwixt us and ourselves as betwixt us and others. 'Magnam rem puta unum hominem agere.'"—MONTAIGNE. ii. 1, p. 155.

Rousseau (*Conf.* b. ix.) tells us that he was so much struck with this singularity, that he contemplated writing a work on the subject: "L'on a remarqué que la plupart des

139.

Coldness in love is a sure means of being beloved.

140.

Men talk little when vanity does not prompt them.

141.

We would rather speak ill of ourselves than not talk of ourselves at all.

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hommes sont dans les cours de leur vie souvent dissemblables à eux-mêmes, et semblent se transformer en des hommes tout différens. Ce n'étoit pas pour établir une chose aussi connue, que je voulois faire un livre ; j'avois un objet plus neuf, et même plus important, c'étoit de chercher les causes de ces variations et de m'attacher à celles qui dependoient de nous, pour montrer comment elles pouvoient être dirigées par nousmêmes, pour nous rendre meilleurs et plus surs de nous."

139. Among the epigrams of John Owen (pub. 1612) is the following—

"Rarus amatur amans, ut amere inamabilis esto
Omnibus ; a nullis vis ut ameris ? ama."

"The great secrets of being courted are, to shun others, and seem delighted with yourself."—Bulwer Lytton.

"Contemnite amantes
Sic hodie veniet si qua negavit heri."
Propertius, *Eleg.* 2. xiv. 19.

141. "Un homme vain trouve son compte à dire du bien

142.

One thing which makes us find so few people who appear reasonable and agreeable in conversation is, that there is scarcely any one who does not think more of what he is about to say than of answering precisely what is said to him. The cleverest and most complaisant people content themselves with merely showing an attentive countenance, while we can see in their eyes and minds a wandering from what is said to them, and an impatience to return to what they wish to say; instead of reflecting that it is a bad method of pleasing or persuading others, to be so studious of pleasing oneself; and that listening well and answering well is one of the greatest perfections that can be attained in conversation.

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ou du mal de soi; un homme modeste ne parle point de soi."—La Bruyere.

"Montaigne's vanity led him to talk perpetually of himself, and, as often happens to vain men, he would rather talk of his own failings than of any foreign subject."—Hallam, *Lit. of Europe*, vol. ii. p. 170. Ed. 1839.

142. La Bruyère has a fine passage illustrative of this sentiment: "L'esprit de la conversation consiste bien moins à en montrer beaucoup qu'à en faire trouver aux

143.

A man of wit would often be embarrassed without the company of fools.

144.

We often boast that we are never weary of ourselves. We are such braggarts, that we do not like to allow that we are bad company for ourselves.

145.

As it is the characteristic of great wits to convey a great deal in a few words, so, on the contrary, small wits have the gift of speaking much and saying nothing.

146.

It is rather by estimation of our own senti-

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autres; celui qui sort de votre entretien content de soi et de son esprit l'est de vous parfaitement. Les hommes n'aiment point à vous admirer, ils veulent plaire; ils cherchent moins à être instruits et même réjouis qu'à être goutés et applaudis, et le plaisir le plus délicat est de faire celui d'autrui."—*De la Société.*

143. "Wits uniformly exclaim against fools, yet fools are their proper foil, and it is from them alone they can learn what figure themselves make."—SHENSTONE, *Men and Manners.*

ments that we exaggerate the good qualities of others, than by estimation of their merit; and we wish to attract praise for ourselves even when we seem to be praising them.

147.

We are not fond of praising, and never praise any one except from interested motives. Praise is a clever, concealed, and delicate flattery, which gratifies in different ways the giver and the receiver. The one takes it as a recompense of his merit, and the other bestows it to display his equity and discernment.

148.

We often choose envenomed praises, which, by a reaction, expose faults in those we are praising that we should not dare to discover in any other way.

149.

We seldom praise but to be praised.

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147. "L'on dit à la cour du bien de quelqu'un pour deux raisons. La première, afin qu'il apprenne que nous disons du bien de lui; la seconde, afin qu'il en dise de nous."—La Bruyere, *De la Cour*.

148. See No. 330, and note.

149. See note on 147.

150.

Few people are wise enough to prefer useful reproof to treacherous praise.

151.

There are reproaches which praise, and praises which convey satire.

152.

A refusal of praise is a desire to be praised twice.

153.

The desire of meriting the praise we receive fortifies our virtue; and that bestowed on talent, courage, and beauty, contributes to augment them.

154.

It is more difficult to avoid being governed than it is to govern others.

155.

If we did not flatter ourselves, the flattery of others would be very harmless.

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155. See No. 3.

156.

Nature creates merit, and fortune brings it into play.

157.

Fortune corrects us of more faults than reason is able to correct.

158.

Some people are disgusting with great merit —others with great faults are agreeable.

159.

The only merit of some people consists in saying and doing foolish things in a useful manner, and they would spoil all if they changed their conduct.

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158. "Avec de la vertu, de la capacité, et une bonne conduite, on peut être insupportable. Les manières, que l'on neglige comme des petites choses, sont souvent ce qui fait que les hommes se décident de vous en bien ou en mal; une légère attention à les avoir douces et polies previent leurs mauvais jugemens. Il ne faut presque rien pour être cru fier, incivil, méprisant, désobligeant; il faut encore moins pour être estimé tout le contraire."—La Bruyere, *De la Société.*

159. "Tom Tweedle played a good fiddle, but nothing satisfied with the inconsiderable appellation of a fiddler,

160.

Kings do with men as with pieces of money —they give them what value they please, and we are obliged to receive them at their current, and not at their real value.

161.

The glory of men should always be propor-

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dropped the practice, and is now no character."—Shenstone, *Men and Manners.*

160. This remark is probably the origin of the following: "Titles of honor are like the impressions on coin, which add no value to gold and silver, but only render brass current."—*The Koran*, (a work attributed to Sterne, but of questionable parentage;) and Burns' well-known lines:—

"The king can make a belted knight,
A marquis, duke, and a' that,
* * * *
The rank is but the guinea stamp,
The man's the gowd for a' that."

In the life of Dr. South, published by Curll in 1717, and prefixed to the Oxford edition of his works, 1823, this maxim, with the substitution of "commonwealths" for "kings," is with Maxim 235, attributed to the "characteristic terseness" of that learned divine. It was omitted by La Rochefoucauld in the last edition he published, on the ground, says the Abbé Brotier, that it is less a moral axiom than a conversational witticism; a dictum which would however exclude many others of the maxims.

tioned to the means they have employed to acquire it.

162.

It is not sufficient to have great qualities; we must be able to make proper use of them.

163.

However brilliant an action may be, it ought not to pass for great when it is not the result of a great design.

164.

There ought to be a certain proportion between actions and designs, if we would draw from them all the results they are capable of producing.

165.

The art of being able to make a good use of moderate abilities wins esteem, and often confers more reputation than real merit.

166.

There is an infinity of modes of conduct which appear ridiculous, the secret reasons of which are wise and sound.

167.

It is more easy to appear worthy of employments which we do not, than of those which we do possess.

168.

Our merit gains us the esteem of the virtuous—our star that of the public.

169.

The world more often rewards the appearances of merit than it does merit itself.

170.

Avarice is more opposed to economy than liberality is.

171.

Hope, deceitful as she is, serves at least to conduct us through life by an agreeable path.

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167. This is the remark of Tacitus respecting Galba, "Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset."—*Hist.* i. 49.

168. "All give to dust that is a little gilt
More laud than gilt o'er dusted."
Troilus and Cressida. Act. iii. Sc. 3.

172.

Indolence and timidity often keep us to our duty, while our virtue carries off all the credit of doing so.

173.

It is difficult to determine whether an open, sincere, and virtuous action is the result of probity or artfulness.

174.

The virtues are lost in interest, as rivers are lost in the sea.

175.

If we examine well the different effects of ennui, we shall find that it makes us neglect more duties than interest does.

176.

There are various sorts of curiosity: one is from interest, which makes us desire to know

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172. "Quod segnitia erat sapientia vocaretur."—TACITUS, *Hist.* i. c. 49.

176. In the original edition this stood, "There are *two* sorts of curiosity," &c., upon which Bishop Butler (Preface to Sermons) observes, "The author of *Réflexions Morales*,

what may be useful to us; another is from pride, and arises from a desire of knowing what others are ignorant of.

177.

It is better to employ our minds in supporting the misfortunes which actually happen, than in anticipating those which may happen to us.

178.

It is never so difficult to speak as when we are ashamed of our silence.

&c., says curiosity proceeds from interest or pride, which pride also would doubtless have been explained to be self-love; as if there were no such passions in mankind as desire of esteem, or of being beloved, or of knowledge." Pascal will only allow one species, "La curiosité n'est que la vanité. Le plus souvent on ne veut sçavoir que pour en parler; on ne voyageroit pas sur la mer pour ne jamais en rien dire et pour le seul plaisir de voir sans espérance de s'en entretenir jamais avec personne."—*Pensées, Vanité de l'Homme.* It is to be feared, however, that there are some kinds of curiosity which have not even so good a motive as vanity.

177. This is the Scriptural maxim, "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."—*St. Matthew*, chap. vi. 34.

Rousseau observes, "La prévoyance qui nous porte sans cesse au-delà de nous, et souvent nous place où nous n'arriverons point, voilà la véritable source de toutes nos misères."—*Emile*, b. ii.

179.

Constancy in love is a perpetual inconstancy, which causes the heart to attach itself successively to all the qualities of the person we love, giving the preference sometimes to one, sometimes to another; so that this constancy is nothing but an inconstancy, limited and confined to one object.

180.

There are two sorts of constancy in love—one arises from continually discovering in the

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178. "Our sensibilities are so acute,
The fear of being silent makes us mute."
COWPER, *Conversation.*

179. There appears to be an instance of this kind of inconstancy in SHAKSPEARE'S *Winter's Tale*, Act iv. Scene 3:

"What you do
Still betters what is done. When you speak, sweet,
I'd have you do it ever; when you sing
I'd have you buy and sell so; so give alms;
Pray so; and for the ordering your affairs,
To sing them too. When you do dance, I wish you
A wave of the sea, that you might ever do
Nothing but that; move still, still so, and own
No other function: each your doing,
So singular in each particular,
Crowns what you're doing in the present deeds,
That all your acts are queens.'

loved person new subjects for love, the other arises from our making a merit of being constant.

181.

There are very few people who, when their love is over, are not ashamed of having been in love.

182.

We can love nothing except with reference to ourselves; and we are merely following our own taste and pleasure when we prefer our friends to ourselves. It is, nevertheless, by this preference alone that friendship can be true and perfect.

183.

The first movement of joy which we experience at the good fortune of our friends does not always arise from the goodness of our nature, nor from the friendship we have for them. It is more often the result of self-love which flatters us with the hope of being fortunate in our turn, or of deriving some advantage from their good fortune.

184.

Men would not live long in society if they were not the dupes of each other.

185.

Perseverance deserves neither blame nor praise, inasmuch as it is merely the duration of tastes and opinions, which we can neither give nor take away from ourselves.

186.

We sometimes make frivolous complaints of our friends to justify beforehand our own fickleness.

187.

Our repentance is not so much regret for the evil we have done, as fear of its consequences to us.

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186. It is difficult to render in English the exact point of this maxim, from there being in the original an untranslateable play on the words "légèrement" and "légèreté."

187. "You do repent
As that the sin hath brought you to this shame,
Which sorrow is always toward ourselves, not heaven,
Showing, we'd not spare heaven as we love it,
But as we stand in fear."

Measure for Measure, Act ii. Scene 3.

So Cassio, on recovering from his drunken fit, is not so much concerned for his fault as distressed at his loss of reputation:—"Reputation, reputation, reputation. Oh! I

188.

There is a kind of inconstancy which arises from levity of mind, or from its weakness causing it to receive all the opinions of others. There is another kind, more excusable, which comes from satiety.

189.

What makes us like new acquaintances is not so much any weariness of our old ones, or the pleasure of change, as disgust at not being sufficiently admired by those who know us too well, and the hope of being more so by those who do not know so much of us.

190.

The vices enter into the composition of the virtues, as poisons into that of medicines. Pru-

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have lost my reputation. I have lost the immortal part, sir, of myself, and what remains is bestial."—*Othello*, Act ii. Scene 3.

A modern authoress has gone still deeper: "We are all liable to this error, of imagining that we are grieved at a fault, when we are only grieved at having done something to lower ourselves in our own estimation."—*Margaret Percival*, vol. ii. chap. 33.

190. "As our bodies are compounded of different elements, so are our minds of various passions. And as the

dence collects and arranges them, and uses them beneficially against the ills of life.

191.

For the credit of virtue it must be admitted that the greatest evils which befall mankind are caused by their crimes.

192.

There are some crimes which become innocent, and even glorious, by their renown, their number, and their excess. Hence it is that public robberies become proofs of talent, and seizing whole provinces unjustly is called making conquests.

193.

We confess our faults, to make amends by

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blending of the former creates the union of body, so is all virtue produced by the balancing or commixing of the several affections and propensities of the soul. As our bodies are formed of clay, so are even our virtues made up of meanness or vice. Add vain-glory to avarice and it rises to ambition. Lust inspires the lover, and selfish wants the friend. Prudence arises from fear, and courage arises from madness or from pride."—STERNE, *Koran.*

192. "Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus *imperium;* atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, *pacem* appellant."—TACITUS, *Agricola,* c. 30.

our sincerity for the harm they have done us in the opinion of others.

194.

There are heroes in evil as well as in good.

195.

We do not despise all those who have vices, but we despise all those who have not a single virtue.

196.

The name of virtue is as serviceable to interest as vice is.

197.

The health of the soul is no more secure than that of the body; and though we may appear free from passions, we are in quite as much danger of being carried away by them as we are of falling sick when we are in health.

198.

It would seem that Nature has prescribed to every one from the moment of his birth certain limits for virtue and vice.

199.

It belongs only to great men to have great faults.

200.

It may be said that the vices await us in the journey of life like hosts with whom we must successively lodge; and I doubt whether experience would make us avoid them if we were to travel the same road a second time.

201.

When our vices quit us we flatter ourselves with the belief that it is we who quit them.

202.

There are relapses in the disorders of the soul as well as in those of the body. What we take to be our cure is most often nothing but an intermission or a change of the disorder.

203.

The faults of the soul are like wounds in the body. Whatever care we take to cure them the scar always appears, and they are every moment in danger of re-opening.

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201. "When men grow virtuous in their old age, they are merely making a sacrifice to God of the devil's leavings."—SWIFT, *Thoughts on Various Subjects.*

204.

What often prevents our abandoning ourselves to a single vice is, our having more than one.

205.

We easily forget our faults when they are only known to ourselves.

206.

There are some people of whom we should never have believed evil unless we had seen it, but there are none at whom we ought to be surprised when we do see it.

207.

We enhance the reputation of some with a view of depreciating that of others; and sometimes we should not praise the Prince de Condé and M. de Turenne so much, if we did not wish to blame them both.

208.

The desire of appearing clever often prevents our becoming so.

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205. "Innocentem quisque se dicit respiciens testem non conscientiam."—SENECA.

209.

Virtue would not travel so far if vanity did not keep her company.

210.

He who thinks he can find in himself the means of doing without others is much mistaken; but he who thinks that others cannot do without him is still more mistaken.

211.

Pretenders to virtue are those who disguise their faults from others as well as from themselves. The truly virtuous know their imperfections and confess them.

212.

A truly virtuous man is he who prides himself upon nothing.

213.

Severity of demeanor in women is a species

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209. "Contemptu famæ contemni virtutes."—TACITUS, *Ann.* 4. c. 38. Englished by Ben Jonson, "Contempt of fame begets contempt of virtue."

213. "To what use serves the artifice of this virgin modesty, this grave coldness, this severe countenance, but

of decoration and paint which they add to their beauty.

214.

The virtue of women is often love of their reputation and of their quiet.

215.

It is to be a truly virtuous man to wish to be always exposed to the view of virtuous people.

216.

Folly pursues us in every period of life. If any one appears wise, it is only because his follies are proportioned to his age and fortune.

217.

There are some silly people who know themselves, and make a clever use of their silliness.

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to increase in us the desire to overcome, and with more gluttony subject to our appetites all this ceremony and all these obstacles. We should believe that their hearts tremble with affright, that the very sound of our words offends the purity of their ears, that they hate us for talking so, and only yield to our importunity by a compulsive force. Beauty, all powerful as it is, has not wherewithal to make itself relished without the mediation of these little acts."—MONTAIGNE, b. ii. c. 15.

218.

He who lives without folly is not so wise as he thinks.

219.

As we grow old we become more foolish and more wise.

220.

Some people resemble ballads, which are only sung for a certain time.

221.

The generality of people only judge of men by the fashion they are in, or by their fortunes.

222.

Love of glory, fear of shame, the design of making a fortune, the desire of rendering our lives easy and agreeable, and the envious wish of lowering the fame of others are often the causes of that valor so celebrated among men.

223.

Valor in common soldiers is a dangerous

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223. "Men venture necks to gain a fortune,
The soldier does it every day,
(Eight to the week,) for sixpence pay."
Hudibras, Part ii. Canto 1, line 512.

trade, which they have adopted to gain their livelihood.

224.

Perfect bravery and thorough cowardice are two extremes which are seldom reached. The space between the two is great, and comprehends all other kinds of courage, between which there is as much difference as between countenances and dispositions. There are some men who expose themselves readily at the commencement of an action, and are disheartened and discouraged by its duration; some are content as soon as they have satisfied their reputation with the world, and do very little beyond this. We see some who are not at all times equally masters of their fears; others suffer themselves to be carried away by general

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224. Montaigne denies that any man can be brave who is not uniformly so. "If a man were brave he would be uniformly so, and upon all occasions. If it were a habit of virtue and not a sally it would render a man equally resolute in all accidents, *the same alone as in company*, the same in lists as in battles, for let people say what they will, there is not one valor for the street and another for the field. He would bear a sickness in his bed as bravely as a wound in the trenches, and no more fear death in his own house than at an assault. We should not then see the same man charge into a breach with a brave assurance, and

panics; others go to the charge because they dare not remain in their posts. We find some in whom an acquaintance with petty dangers strengthens their courage, and prepares them to expose themselves to greater ones. Some are brave when sword in hand, and yet dread the fire of musketry; others are steady under fire, and fear the sword. All these different species of courage concur in this, that night, by augmenting fear and concealing good or bad actions, gives the privilege of being discreet. There is another species of discretion which is more general, for we never see a man perform as much in an encounter as he might do if he were sure of coming off safe; so that it is evident the fear of death subtracts something from courage.

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afterwards torment himself and whine like a woman for the loss of a law-suit, or the death of a child. When being a coward in arms he is firm under poverty, when he starts at the sight of a barber's razor but rushes fearless among the swords of the enemy, the action is commendable, but not the man."—Book ii. chap. 1.

This passage in Montaigne appears to have suggested to Rousseau the following: "Tel affronte sur la brêche la mort et le fer de son ennemi qui dans le secret de sa maison ne peut soutenir la vue du fer salutaire d'un chirurgien."—*Discours sur cette Question "Quelle est la vertu la plus nécessaire aux héros," &c.*

225.

Perfect valor is to do unwitnessed what we should be capable of doing before all the world.

226.

Intrepidity is an extraordinary strength of mind, which raises it above the troubles, the disorders, and the emotions, which the sight of great perils is calculated to excite; it is by this strength that heroes maintain themselves in a tranquil state of mind, and preserve the free use of their reason under the most surprising and terrible circumstances.

227.

Hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue.

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225. "It is said of untrue valors that some men's valors are in the eyes of them that look on."—BACON, *Advancement of Learning.*

227. Massillon has adopted this celebrated thought in one of his sermons. "Le vice rend hommage à la vertu en s'honorant de ses apparences;" and it probably also suggested to Cowper the following passage in the *Task*, b. iii.:—

"Hypocrisy, detest her as we may,
(And no man's hatred ever wrong'd her yet,)

228.

The generality of men expose themselves in battle sufficiently to save their honor, but few are on all occasions willing to expose themselves as much as is necessary to insure the success of the enterprise for which they expose themselves.

229.

Vanity, shame, and above all temperament, are often the causes of courage in men, and of virtue in women.

230.

We are unwilling to lose our lives, and we wish to acquire glory. This is the cause of brave men having more tact and ability in avoiding death, than intriguing people have in preserving their fortunes.

May claim this merit still—that she admits
The worth of what she mimics with such care,
And thus gives virtue indirect applause."

229. "Vanity bids all her sons be brave, and all her daughters chaste and courteous. But why do we need her instructions? Ask the comedian who is taught a part which he does not feel."—STERNE, *Sermons*.

231.

There are very few persons who, in the first decline of life, do not let us see the points in which their bodies and minds will fail.

232.

In the intercourse of our life we more often please by our faults than our good qualities.

233.

A man may be ungrateful, and yet less blamable for his ingratitude than him who conferred the favor.

234.

Gratitude is like the good faith of traders,

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232. "'A man's errors are what render him amiable,' says Goethe, in the last number of his Journal of Art, that is, in his seventy-seventh year. I said one day to a girl of fourteen, 'If you were but as good as your brother.' 'Well,' she replied, with something of a bashful sullenness, 'I don't care, you would not be so fond of me if I was.' This coincidence between the aged poet and the child just emerging from childhood—laugh not, reader—Goethe himself would be delighted to be told of it—might suggest many reflections on the waywardness of the heart, and the perverse nature of affection."—*Guesses at Truth*, vol. ii. p. 79. First Edition.

it maintains commerce; and we often pay, not because it is just to discharge our debts, but that we may more readily find people to trust us.

235.

It is not all who fulfil the duties of gratitude who can on that account flatter themselves that they are grateful.

236.

What causes such a miscalculation in the amount of gratitude which men expect for the favors they have done, is, that the pride of the giver and that of the receiver can never agree as to the value of the benefit.

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236. Rousseau has some excellent remarks on this subject. "L'ingratitude seroit plus rare si les bienfaits à usure étoient moins communes. On aime ce qui nous fait du bien. C'est un sentiment si naturel! L'ingratitude n'est pas dans le cœur de l'homme, mais l'intérêt y est. Il y a moins d'obligés ingrats que de bienfaiteurs intéressés. Si vous me vendez vos dons, je marchanderai sur le prix, mais si vous feignez de donner pour vendre ensuite à votre mot vous usez de fraude. C'est d'être gratuits qui les rend inestimables."—*Emile*, b. iv. An attention to these and to La Rochefoucauld's remarks would prevent much misconception on the subject of gratitude.

237.

Too great eagerness to requite an obligation is a species of ingratitude.

238.

Men more easily set bounds to their gratitude than to their hopes or their desires.

239.

Pride does not like to owe, and self-love does not like to pay.

240.

The good that we have received from any man should make us respect the evil that he does us.

241.

Nothing is so contagious as example; and we never do any great good or great evil which does not produce its like. We imitate good actions from emulation, and bad ones from the depravity of our nature, which shame would keep prisoner, and example sets at liberty.

242.

It is a great folly to wish to be exclusively wise.

243.

Whatever pretext we may assign for our afflictions, it is often only interest or vanity which causes them.

244.

There are divers sorts of hypocrisy in grief. In one, under pretext of lamenting the loss of a person who is dear to us, we lament ourselves, we lament the diminution of our advantages,

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244. The reader may like to compare Young's lines on the same subject. *Night Thoughts*, Night 5:—

"Our funeral tears from various causes rise,
Of various kinds they flow. From tender hearts
By soft contagion call'd some burst at once,
And stream obsequious to the leading eye.
Some ask more time by curious art distill'd.
Some hearts in secret hard, unapt to melt,
Struck by the public eye gush out amain.
Some weep to share the fame of the deceased,
So high in merit, and to them so dear;
They dwell on praises which they think they share.
Some mourn in proof that something they could love,
They weep not to relieve their grief, but show.
Some weep in perfect justice to the dead,
As conscious all their love is in arrear.
Some mischievously weep not unappris'd.
Tears sometimes help the conquest of an eye,

of our pleasure, of our consideration. We regret the good opinion that was entertained of us. Thus the dead get the credit of tears which are only shed for the living. I call this a species of hypocrisy, because in this sort of grief we deceive ourselves. There is another hypocrisy which is not so innocent, inasmuch as it imposes on all the world. It is the affliction of certain persons who aspire to the distinction of a striking and perpetual grief. After time, which consumes all things, has put a stop to the sorrow they really feel, they obstinately continue their tears, their complaints, and their sighs. They assume a doleful demeanor, and labor to persuade others by all their actions that their sorrow will only terminate with their lives. This miserable and fatiguing vanity is generally met with in ambitious women. As their sex bars them from all the paths of glory, they strive to render themselves celebrated by the display of inconsolable grief. There is yet another species of tears which have very petty sources, which flow easily, and as easily are

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As seen through crystal how their roses glow,
While liquid pearl runs trickling down their cheek!
By kind construction some are deem'd to weep
Because a decent veil conceals their joy."

dried: we weep to acquire the reputation of a tender heart; we weep to be pitied; we weep to be wept over; in fine, we weep to avoid the shame of not weeping.

245.

In the adversity of our best friends we often find something which does not displease us.

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245. "As Rochefoucauld his maxims drew
From Nature, I believe them true.
They argue no corrupted mind
In him—the fault is in mankind.

"This maxim more than all the rest
Is thought too base for human breast.
In all distresses of our friends
We first consult our private ends,
While Nature kindly bent to ease us
Points out some circumstance to please us.

"If this perhaps your patience move
Let reason and experience prove.
* * * *
To all my foes dear Fortune send
Thy gifts, but never to my friend;
I tamely can endure the first,
But this with envy makes me burst."

SWIFT, *Verses on his own Death.*

246.

We easily console ourselves for the disgrace of our friends when it serves to signalize our affection for them.

247.

It may seem that self-love is the dupe of

This well-known maxim is, as Swift has remarked, that which has excited the greatest amount of ire and clamor against La Rochefoucauld, who was on this account, perhaps, induced to suppress it in the last edition he published. Byron has despondingly alluded to it (*Childe Harold*, canto 3):—

"I would believe
That some o'er others' griefs sincerely grieve."

After all, the sentiment is not much more than is expressed in the well-known lines of Lucretius.

"Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis
E terra alterius magnum spectare laborem;
Non, quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas,
Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est."
Book ii. v. 1.

Burke (*Sublime and Beautiful*, part i. section 14, 15) says, "I am convinced that we have a degree of delight and that no small one in the real misfortunes and pains of others." But he differs from Lucretius in thinking that our own immunity from suffering is the *condition* and not the *cause* of our pleasure. (sect. 15.)

good-nature, and that it forgets itself whenever we are laboring for the advantage of others. Nevertheless, it is taking the surest road to reach our objects; it is lending on usury under pretence of giving; it is in fact gaining over every one by a subtle and delicate method.

248.

No man deserves to be praised for his goodness unless he has strength of character to be wicked. All other goodness is generally nothing but indolence or impotence of will.

249.

It is not so dangerous to do evil to the generality of men as to do them too much good.

250.

Nothing flatters our pride so much as the confidence of the great, because we regard it as the result of our merit, without considering that it most frequently arises merely from vanity or from inability to keep a secret.

251.

We may say of agreeableness, as distinct from beauty, that it consists in a symmetry of which we know not the rules, and a secret con-

formity of the features to each other, and to the air and complexion of the person.

252.

Coquetry is the essential characteristic, and the prevalent humor of women; but they do not all practise it, because the coquetry of some is restrained by fear or by reason.

253.

We often inconvenience others, when we fancy we can never possibly do so.

254.

We are very far from being acquainted with the whole of our will.

255.

Nothing is impossible: there are ways which

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252. "La femme est coquette par état, mais sa coquetterie change de forme et d'objet selon ses vues."—ROUSSEAU, *Emile.*

255. So Shelley:—

"It is our will
That thus enchains us to permitted ill.
We might be otherwise; we might be all
We dream of, happy, high, majestical.

lead to every thing; and if we had sufficient will we should always have sufficient means.

256.

The sovereign ability consists in knowing thoroughly the value of things.

257.

It is a great ability to be able to conceal one's ability.

258.

What appears to be generosity is often nothing but a disguised ambition, which despises petty interests in order to reach greater ones.

259.

The fidelity shown by the generality of men is only an invention of self-love to attract confidence—it is a means of raising ourselves above others, and of becoming depositaries of the most important affairs.

Where is the beauty, love, and truth we seek
But in our minds? and if we were not weak,
Should we be less in deed than in desire?
Julian and Maddalo.

257. "C'est avoir fait un grand pas dans la finesse que de faire penser de soi qu'on n'est que médiocrement fin."—La Bruyère, *De la Cour.*

260.

Magnanimity despises every thing to gain every thing.

261.

There is as much eloquence in the tone of voice, in the eyes, and in the air of a speaker, as in his choice of words.

262.

True eloquence consists in saying all that is necessary, and nothing but what is necessary.

263.

There are some persons on whom their faults sit well, and others who are made ungraceful by their good qualities.

264.

It is as common to see a change of tastes, as it is uncommon to see a change of inclinations.

265.

Interest brings into play every sort of virtue and of vice.

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260. See No. 296.

266.

Humility is often only a feigned submission, of which we make use to render others submissive. It is an artifice of pride which abases in order to exalt itself; and though it transforms itself in a thousand different ways, it is never better disguised and more capable of deceiving than when it conceals itself under the garb of humility.

267.

All the sentiments have a tone of voice,

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266. "Un des caractères les plus marqués de l'orgueil c'est cette imposture de vanité qui cherche la gloire dans les humiliations mêmes, et qui ne parait s'avilir aux yeux des hommes qu'afin que leurs applaudissemens aillent la placer encore plus haut que n'était le lieu où elle était descendue. L'orgueil se cache pour être découvert; on ne fuit l'éclât qu'afin que l'éclât nous suive; on ne renonce aux honneurs que pour être honoré; on ne souffre le mépris, que lorsqu'il nous est glorieux pour être méprisés. L'orgueil a mille dédommagemens imperceptibles à nous-mêmes; et rien n'est plus rare qu'une humiliation volontaire qui ne conduit qu'à l'humilité."—Massillon, *Serm. Incarnat.*

"He saw a cottage with a double coach-house,
A cottage of gentility,
And the devil was pleased, for his darling sin
Is the pride that apes humility."

Southey, *Devil's Walk.*

gestures, and countenances, peculiar each to itself; and this conformity, as it is good or bad, agreeable or disagreeable, causes people to be pleasing or displeasing.

268.

In all the professions every one affects a particular look and exterior, in order to appear what he wishes to be thought, so that it may be said the world is made up of appearances.

269.

Gravity is a mystery of the body, invented to conceal the defects of the mind.

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269. There is, and ever has been, a singular prejudice in the world and society against any connection between wisdom and levity of manners. "Il n'est pas ordinaire," as La Bruyère observes, "que celui qui fait rire se fasse estimer." But however well founded this prejudice may be, it has, no doubt, been carried to excess, and designing men have readily taken advantage of it to cloak their artifices and conceal their deficiencies, under the covering of gravity and seriousness. The disguise, however, has been seen through and denounced by many writers besides La Rochefoucauld, whose knowledge of the world and of mankind gives them a title to be heard. Horace in his age could inquire,—

"Ridentem dicere verum
Quid vetat?" *Sat.* i. 1, 24.

270.

Flattery is a false coin, which only derives its currency from our vanity.

Shakspeare holds up to ridicule—

"the sort of men whose visages
Do cream and mantle like a standing pool,
And do a wilful stillness entertain,
With purpose to be dress'd in an opinion
Of wisdom, gravity, profound conceit;
As who should say, I am Sir Oracle,
And when I ope my lips let no dog bark."

Merchant of Venice.

"I have observed," says Lord Bolingbroke, "that in comedies the best actor plays the droll, while some scrub rogue is made the fine gentleman or hero. Thus it is in the farce of life,—wise men spend their time in mirth, 'tis only fools who are serious." Lord Shaftesbury also observes, that "Gravity is of the very essence of imposture; it does not only make us mistake other things, but is apt perpetually almost to mistake itself." Sterne is still more severe on gravity. "Yorick sometimes in his wild way of talking would say, that Gravity was an arrant scoundrel, and, he would add, of the most dangerous kind too, because a sly one; and that he verily believed more honest well-meaning people were bubbled out of their goods and money by it in one twelvemonth than by pocket-picking and shop-lifting in seven. In the naked temper which a merry heart discovered, he would say, there was no danger but to itself; whereas the very essence of Gravity was design, and con-

271.

Civility is a desire to receive it in turn, and and to be accounted well bred.

272.

The education commonly given to the young is a second self-love with which they are inspired.

273.

There is no passion in which self-love reigns so powerfully as in love; and we are often more disposed to sacrifice the peace of the loved object than to lose our own.

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sequently deceit; it was a taught trick to gain credit of the world for more sense and knowledge than a man was worth, and that, with all its pretensions, it was no better but often worse, than what a French wit had long ago defined it, viz., *a mysterious carriage of the body to cover the defects of the mind;* which definition of gravity Yorick with great imprudence would say, *deserved to be wrote in letters of gold.*" —*Tristram Shandy*, vol. i. chap. ii. The list may be closed with a remark of the shrewd observer Lavater, "Too much gravity argues a shallow mind."

Notwithstanding these authorities, it is to be feared that gravity still retains its power of imposing on the credulity of the world, though it may, perhaps, be considered a less dangerous, because more easily detected, mode of imposture than that denounced by our author in Maxim 300, namely, affected simplicity.

274.

What is called liberality is most often only the vanity of giving, which we like better than the thing we give.

275.

Pity is often a perception of our own misfortunes in those of others; it is a clever foresight of the evils into which we may fall. We succor others in order to engage them to succor us in similar circumstances; and the services

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275. This is one of the maxims which has been subject to the most unfavorable comments, but the author, as will appear from the following quotations, was by no means singular in his views of pity. Aristotle defines pity to be "a sort of a pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying, appearing to befall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure, or that some person connected with him will; and this when it appears near; for it evidently is necessary that a person likely to feel pity should be actually such as to deem that, either in his own person, or in the person of some one connected with him, he may suffer some evil, and that an evil of such a description as has been stated."—*Rhet.* book ii. ch. viii. The philosopher Aristippus appears to have held a nearly similar opinion, for "being asked why men gave to the poor rather than to philosophers, he replied, because they think themselves may sooner come to be poor than to be philosophers."—BACON, *Apophthegms.*

we render them are, to speak properly, a good which we do to ourselves by anticipation.

276.

Narrowness of mind is the cause of obstinacy—we do not easily believe what is beyond our sight.

277.

It is deceiving ourselves to fancy that it is only the violent passions, such as ambition and love, which can triumph over the others. In-

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Publius Syrus is to the same effect:—

"Homo qui in homine calamitoso est misericors meminit sui.
In adversis tutelam parat, qui in secundis commodat."

Hobbes says, "Grief for the calamity of another is pity, and ariseth from the imagination that a like calamity may befall himself, and therefore is called compassion."—*Leviathan.*

"On ne plaint jamais dans autrui que les maux dont on ne se croit pas exempt soi-même."—ROUSSEAU, *Emile*, 4.

La Bruyère, in a passage aimed probably at La Rochefoucauld, has a stinging remark on these definitions, which, indeed, it goes far towards overthrowing:—"S'il est vrai que la pitié ou la compassion soit un retour vers nous-mêmes qui nous met en la place des malheureux, pourquoi tirent-ils de nous si peu de soulagement dans leurs misères?" —*Du Cœur.*

dolence, all languid as it is, nevertheless is frequently their master; it spreads its dominion over all the designs and all the actions of life, and thus destroys and insensibly consumes the passions and the virtues.

278.

Readiness to believe evil without sufficient examination is the result of pride and indolence. We wish to find people guilty, and we do not wish to give ourselves the trouble of examining into the crimes.

279.

We take exceptions to judges who are in the least degree interested, and yet we are quite willing that our reputation and our fame should depend on the judgment of men who are all opposed to us, either from jealousy, or from prejudice, or from want of intelligence; it is only to induce them to decide in our favor

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279. This thought would seem to be suggested by the following passage in Montaigne, *Essays*, book ii. c. 16, of Glory: "A dozen men must be culled out of a whole nation to judge of an acre of land; and the judgment of our inclinations and actions, the most important thing that is, we refer to the voice and determination of the rabble, the mother of ignorance, prejudice, and inconstancy. Is it

that we peril in so many ways our repose and our lives.

280.

Scarcely any man is clever enough to know all the evil he does.

281.

Honor acquired is security for that which should be acquired.

282.

Youth is perpetual intoxication; it is the fever of reason.

283.

We like to divine others, but we do not like to be divined ourselves.

284.

Some people obtain the approbation of the

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reasonable that the life of a wise man should depend on the judgment of fools?"

La Bruyère has a remark to the same purport:—"Nous cherchons notre bonheur hors de nous-mêmes et dans l'opinion des hommes que nous connaissons flatteurs, peu sincères, sans équité, pleins d'envie, de caprices, et de préventions. Quelle bizarrerie?"—*De l'Homme.*

world, whose only merit consists in the vices which serve to carry on the commerce of life.

285.

Preserving the health by too strict a regimen is a wearisome malady.

286.

Absence diminishes moderate passions and increases great ones, as the wind extinguishes tapers and adds fury to fire.

287.

Good nature, which boasts of so much sensibility, is often stifled by the most petty interest.

288.

Women often fancy themselves in love even when they are not. The occupation of an in-

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285. "People who are always taking care of their health are like misers, who are hoarding up a treasure which they have never spirit enough to enjoy."—STERNE, *Koran.* See Plato's account of Herodicus, *Repub.* book 3.

288. "Peut-être dans le cours de la vie une véritable passion; surement des gouts en assez grand nombre pris pour l'amour; * * * une femme s'est fait enfin une habitude de la faiblesse, et elle se croit perpetuellement victime de la sensibilité de son cœur quand elle ne l'est que de son

trigue, the emotion of mind which gallantry produces, the natural leaning to the pleasure of being loved, and the pain of refusing, persuade them that they feel the passion of love, when, in reality, they feel nothing but coquetry.

289.

What makes us often discontented with negotiators is that they almost always abandon the interest of their friends for that of the success of the negotiation, which becomes their own, from the credit of having succeeded in their undertaking.

290.

When we dilate upon the affection of our

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manque de principes, de la moins excusable coquetterie, et du dérèglement de son esprit."—CREBILLON, *Ah quel conte.*

"And if in fact she takes to a 'grande passion,'
It is a very serious thing indeed!
Nine times in ten 'tis but caprice or fashion,
Coquetry, or a wish to take the lead:
The pride of a mere child with a new sash on,
Or wish to make a rival's bosom bleed;
But the tenth instance will be a tornado,
For there's no saying what they will or may do."
BYRON, *Don Juan*, canto 12.

290. This observation will, perhaps, remind the reader of Rousseau's account of his interview with his friend Di-

friends, it is often less from gratitude than from a desire to convey an opinion of our own merit.

291.

The approbation bestowed on those who are entering the world often arises from a secret envy of those already established in it.

292.

Pride, which inspires us with so much envy, serves also to moderate it.

293.

Some disguised falsehoods represent the

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derot, then a prisoner at the Castle of Vincennes:—"Son premier mouvement sorti de mes bras fut de se tourner vers l'ecclésiastique, et de lui dire, 'Vous voyez, monsieur, comment m'aiment mes amis.' Tout entier à mon émotion je ne réfléchis pas d'abord à cette manière d'en tirer avantage, mais en y pensant quelquefois depuis ce temps-là, j'ai toujours jugé qu'à la place de Diderot ce n'eut pas été la première idée qui me serait venue."—*Conf.* book viii.

292. "The reason why men of true good sense envy less than others, is, because they admire themselves with less hesitation than fools and silly people; for, though they do not show this to others, yet the solidity of their thinking gives them an assurance of their real worth, which men of weak understanding never feel within, though they often counterfeit it."—MANDEVILLE, *Fable of the Bees.* Remark N.

truth so well, that it would be bad judgment not to be deceived by them.

294.

There is sometimes as much ability in knowing how to profit by good advice as in arriving at a correct opinion ourselves.

295.

Some bad people would be less dangerous if they had not some goodness.

296.

Magnanimity is well enough defined by its name; nevertheless, we may say that it is the

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295. "In the law of the leprosy, where it is said, 'If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient may pass abroad for clean, but if there be any whole flesh remaining he is to be shut up for unclean,' one of them (the Rabbins) noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction is more dangerous before maturity than after, and another noteth a position in moral philosophy, that men abandoned to vice do not so much corrupt manners as those that are half good and half evil."—Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, b. i.

296. Compare Aristotle's elaborate delineation of the character of the Magnanimous Man, (*Eth. Nicom.* b. 4,) which, however, seems to lack the few fine but expressive touches of La Rochefoucauld. See Maxim 260.

good sense of pride, and the most noble way of earning praise.

297.

It is impossible to love a second time what we have once really ceased to love.

298.

It is not so much fertility of invention which presents us with several expedients for attaining the same object, as it is want of intelligence which causes us to hesitate at every thing which presents itself to the imagination, and prevents our discerning at a glance which is the best.

299.

There are certain affairs and diseases, the remedies of which only aggravate them at particular times; and great ability consists in knowing when it is dangerous to apply these remedies.

300.

Affected simplicity is a refined imposture.

301.

There are more faults in the humor than in the mind.

302.

The merit of men has its season, as fruits have.

303.

It may be said of men's humors as of many buildings, that they have divers aspects—some agreeable, others disagreeable.

304.

Moderation cannot have the credit of combating and subduing ambition—they are never found together. Moderation is the languor and indolence of the soul, as ambition is its activity and ardor.

305.

We always love those who admire us, and we do not always love those whom we admire.

306.

It is difficult to love those whom we do not esteem; but it is not less so to love those whom we esteem more than ourselves.

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306. "To be loved we should merit but little esteem; all superiority attracts awe and aversion."—HELVETIUS.

307.

The humors of the body have a stated and regular course, which impels and imperceptibly guides our will. They co-operate with each other, and exercise successively a secret empire within us; so that they have a considerable part in all our actions, without our being able to know it.

308.

Gratitude in the generality of men is only a strong and secret desire of receiving greater favors.

309.

Almost every one takes a pleasure in requiting trifling obligations; many people are grateful for moderate ones; but there is

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308. "Ille (Voconius) tam grate beneficia interpretatur, ut dum priora accipit posteriora mereatur."—PLINY, *Ep.* ii. 13.

309. Tacitus has furnished us with the limit beyond which favors become irksome. "Beneficia eo usque læta sunt dum videntur *exsolvi posse;* ubi multum antevenêre pro gratiâ odium redditur."—*Annals*, book iv. c. 18.

"When I read P. de Comines several years ago, doubtless a very good author, I there took notice of this forno vulgar saying, that a man must have a care of doing his

scarcely any one who does not show ingratitude for great ones.

310.

There are follies as catching as contagious disorders.

311.

There are people enough who despise wealth, but few who know how to bestow it.

312.

It is generally only in petty interests that we run the hazard of not trusting to appearances.

313.

In whatever respect people may praise us, they never teach us any thing new.

314.

We often pardon those who weary us, but we cannot pardon those whom we weary.

315.

Interest, which is accused of all our crimes,

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master such great service that at last he will not know how to give him his just reward."—MONTAIGNE, *Essays*, book iii. chap. 8.

often deserves to be praised for our good actions.

316.

We seldom find people ungrateful as long as we are in a condition to render them services.

317.

It is as honorable to be boastful to ourselves as it is ridiculous to be so to others.

318.

Men have made a virtue of moderation to limit the ambition of the great, and to console people of mediocrity for their want of fortune and of merit.

319.

There are some people fated to be fools, who not only commit follies from choice, but are compelled to commit them by fortune.

320.

There happen sometimes accidents in life from which it requires a degree of madness to extricate ourselves well.

321.

If there are men whose weak point has

never appeared, it is because it has never been properly sought for.

322.

The reason why lovers and their mistresses are never weary of being together is, that they always talk of themselves.

323.

Why must we have memory enough to retain even the minutest details of what has happened to us, and not enough to remember how many times we have told them to the same person?

324.

The extreme pleasure we take in talking of ourselves should make us fear that we give very little to those who listen to us.

325.

What commonly prevents us from exhibiting the bottom of our hearts to our friends is

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323. "Montaigne also notices 'old men who yet retain the memory of things past and forget how often they have told them' as most tedious companions."—*Essays*, book i. chap. 9.

not so much any distrust we have of them as the distrust we have of ourselves.

326.

Weak persons cannot be sincere.

327.

It is not a great misfortune to oblige ungrateful people, but it is an unsupportable one to be under an obligation to a vulgar man.

328.

We find means to cure folly, but none to reclaim a distorted mind.

329.

We cannot long preserve the sentiments we should have for our friends and benefactors if we often allow ourselves the liberty of speaking of their faults.

330.

To praise princes for virtues they do not possess is to speak evil of them with impunity.

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330. "Praise undeserved is satire in disguise."
POPE, *Imit. Horace*, b. ii. ep. 1.

This maxim may recall to the readers of Scott's novels

331.

We are nearer loving those who hate us than those who love us more than we like.

332.

It is only those who are despicable who fear being despised.

333.

Our wisdom is not less at the mercy of fortune than our property.

334.

In jealousy there is more self-love than love.

335.

We often console ourselves through weakness for evils in which reason is powerless to console us.

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the scene in *Woodstock*, where Alice Lee, in the presence of Charles II., under the assumed name of Louis Kerneguy, describes the character she supposes the king to have. "Kerneguy and his supposed patron felt embarrassed, perhaps from a consciousness that the real Charles fell far short of his ideal character as designed in such glowing colors. In some cases exaggerated or unappropriate praise becomes the most severe satire."— *Woodstock*, vol. ii. c. 4. Edition 1832.

336.

Ridicule dishonors more than dishonor.

337.

We confess our little faults only to persuade others that we have no great ones.

338.

Envy is more irreconcilable than hatred.

339.

We sometimes fancy that we hate flattery, but in reality we only hate the manner of flattery.

340.

We forgive so long as we love.

341.

It is more difficult for a man to be faithful to his mistress when he is favored than when he is ill-treated by her.

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339. "And when I tell him he hates flatterers,
He says he does, being then most flattered."
SHAKSPEARE, *Julius Cæsar.*

341. "Our aunts and grandmothers always tell us that

342.

Women know not the whole of their coquetry.

343.

Women never have a complete severity of demeanor except towards those whom they dislike.

344.

Women can less easily surmount their coquetry than their passions.

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men are a sort of animals that if ever they are constant 'tis only when they are ill used. 'Twas a kind of paradox I could never believe, but experience has shown me the truth of it."—Lady M. W. Montague, *Letters.*

"Les femmes s'attachent aux hommes par les faveurs qu'elles leur accordent. Les hommes guérissent par les mêmes faveurs."—La Bruyere, *Des Femmes.*

"The rigors of mistresses are troublesome, but facility to say truth is more so. 'Si qua volet regnare diu contemnat amantem.' (Ovid. Amor. ii. 19.)"—Montaigne, b. ii. c. 15.

"Prythee tarry,
You men will never tarry.
O foolish Cressid, I might have still held off,
And then you would have tarried."

Troilus and Cressida.

345.

In love deceit almost always goes further than mistrust.

346.

There is a certain kind of love the excess of which prevents jealousy.

347.

It is with certain good qualities as with the senses; those who are entirely deprived of them can neither appreciate nor comprehend them.

348.

When our hatred is too keen, it places us beneath those we hate.

349.

We feel our good and our bad fortune solely in proportion to our self-love.

350.

The intellect of the generality of women serves more to fortify their folly than their reason.

351.

The passions of youth are scarcely more opposed to safety than the lukewarmness of age.

352.

The accent of a man's native country dwells in his mind and in his heart as well as in his speech.

353.

To be a great man one must know how to profit by the whole of one's fortune.

354.

The generality of men have, like plants, latent properties, which chance brings to light.

355.

Opportunities make us known to others, and still more to ourselves.

356.

There can be no regulation in the minds nor in the hearts of women, unless their temperament is in unison with it.

357.

We think very few people sensible except those who are of our opinion.

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357. "That was excellently observed, say I, when I read a passage in an author, where his opinion agrees with mine. When we differ, there I pronounce him to be mistaken."—SWIFT, *Thoughts on Various Subjects.*

358.

In love we often doubt what we most believe.

359.

The greatest miracle of love is the cure of coquetry.

360.

What makes us so sore against those who practise artifices upon us, is that they fancy themselves cleverer than us.

361.

It is very troublesome to come to a rupture when we no longer love.

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360. "Is it not the wound our pride sustains by being deceived that makes us more averse to hypocrites than the most audacious and barefaced villain?"—SHENSTONE, *Men and Manners.*

"I could pardon him all his deceit," said the Duke of Burgundy to the Count de Crevecœur, "but I cannot forgive his supposing me capable of the gross folly of being duped by his professions."—*Quentin Durward.*

361 The reader may be reminded of the difficulty felt by Tom Jones in breaking with Lady Bellaston, and of the manner in which he effected his purpose under the advice of his "privy council."—*Hist. of a Foundling*, b. 15, c. 9.

362.

We are almost always wearied in the company of persons with whom we are not permitted to be weary.

363.

A man of sense may love like a madman, but never like a fool.

364.

There are certain faults which, when turned to good account, gain more reputation than virtue itself.

365.

There are some persons whom, when we lose, we regret more than we mourn; and others whom we mourn and scarcely regret.

366.

In general we only praise heartily those who admire us.

367.

Little minds are too much hurt by little things. Great minds perceive them all, and are not touched by them.

368.

Humility is the true proof of Christian virtues; without it we retain all our faults, and they are only hidden by pride, which conceals them from others, and often from ourselves.

369.

Justice is in general only a lively apprehension of being deprived of what belongs to us; hence arise our great consideration and respect for all the interests of our neighbor, and our scrupulous care to avoid doing him an injury. This fear retains men within the limits of those advantages which birth or fortune has given them; and, without it, they would be making continual inroads upon others.

370.

Justice in moderate judges is only love of their elevation.

371.

The most subtle folly is produced by the most subtle wisdom.

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369. See No. 84, of which this appears to be an expansion.

371. This maxim was suppressed by the author in his later editions, perhaps because he discovered that he had

372.

Moderation in good fortune is commonly nothing but dread of the shame which attends excessive elation, or fear of losing what we possess.

373.

Moderation is like temperance; we should wish to eat more, but are afraid of injuring our health.

374.

Every one blames in his neighbor what the world blames in himself.

375.

It is a kind of happiness to know to what extent we may be unhappy.

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adopted a thought of Montaigne's:—"Of what is the most subtle folly composed, but of the most subtle wisdom?"—*Essays*, book ii. chap. 12.

374. "Men think, and reason, and judge quite differently in any matter relating to themselves from what they do in cases of others where they are not interested. Hence it is one hears people exposing follies for which they themselves are eminent; and talking with great severity against particular vices, which, if all the world be not mistaken, they themselves are notoriously guilty of."—Butler, *Sermon on Self-deceit.*

376.

Fortunate people never correct themselves. They always fancy they are in the right as long as fortune supports their ill conduct.

377.

The charm of novelty is in love what the bloom is on fruits; it gives a lustre which is easily effaced, and which never returns.

378.

The generality of young people fancy that they are natural, when they are only ill-bred and coarse.

379.

Minds of moderate calibre ordinarily condemn every thing which is beyond their range.

380.

It is more often from pride than from want of intelligence that people oppose with so much obstinacy the most received opinions. They

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376. Swift remarks, "The power of fortune is confessed only by the miserable: for the happy impute all their success to prudence and merit."—*Thoughts on Various Subjects.*

find the best places taken in the good party, and do not like to put up with inferior ones.

381.

Good taste springs more from judgment than from intellect.

382.

Nothing ought more to humiliate men who have deserved great praise than the care which they still take to derive consequence from trifles.

383.

We must be able to answer for our fortune to be able to answer for our future conduct.

384.

Infidelities ought to extinguish love, and we should not be jealous, even when we have reason

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381. "It is for the most part in our skill in manners, and in the observances of time and place and of decency in general, that what is called taste, by way of distinction, consists; and which is in reality no other than a more refined judgment. * * The cause of a wrong taste is a defect of judgment."—BURKE, *Sublime and Beautiful.* Introduction.

384. "On tire ce bien de la perfidie des femmes qu'elle guérit de la jalousie."—LA BRUYERE, *Des Femmes.*

to be so; it is only persons who avoid causing jealousy who are worth being jealous of.

385.

People suffer more in our opinion, from the smallest infidelities committed towards ourselves, than from the greatest towards others.

386.

Jealousy is always born with love, but it does not always die with it.

387.

The generality of women mourn the death of their lovers not so much from the love they bore them as to appear more worthy of being loved.

388.

The violences that others do to us are often less painful than those we put on ourselves.

And again, "Celles qui ne nous ménagent sur rien et ne nous épargnent nulles occasions de jalousie, ne mériteraient de nous aucune jalousie, si l'on se réglait plus par leurs sentimens et leur conduite que par son cœur."—*Du Cœur.*

386. "It is said that jealousy is love, but I deny it; for though jealousy be produced by love, as ashes are by fire, yet jealousy extinguishes love as ashes smother the flame." —*Les Cent nouvelles Nouvelles de la Reine de Navarre.*

389.

We know well enough that we ought to speak very little of our wives; but we do not sufficiently know that we ought to speak still less of ourselves.

390.

There are some good qualities which degenerate into faults when they are natural, and others which are never perfect when they are acquired. It must be reason, for instance, that should render us careful of our property and our confidence; and, on the contrary, it must be nature that should bestow on us goodness and courage.

391.

Whatever distrust we may have of the sincerity of those who converse with us, we always believe that they tell us more truth than they do to others.

392.

There are few virtuous women who are not weary of their profession.

393.

The generality of virtuous women are like hidden treasures, only safe because they are not sought for.

394.

There are few cowards who know the extent of their fear.

395.

The violence we do ourselves to prevent falling in love is often more cruel than the severity of the loved object.

396.

It is almost always the fault of the lover not to know when he is no longer loved.

397.

We always dread the sight of the person we love when we have been coquetting elsewhere.

398.

There are certain tears which often deceive ourselves, after having deceived others.

399.

If a man fancies he loves his mistress for her own sake, he is much mistaken.

400.

We ought to console ourselves for our faults when we have strength of mind to confess them.

401.

Envy is destroyed by true friendship, and coquetry by true love.

402.

The greatest fault in penetration is not the not reaching the mark, but overshooting it.

403.

We give advice, but we do not inspire conduct.

404.

When our merit gives way, our taste gives way also.

405.

Fortune displays our virtues and our vices, as light makes all objects apparent.

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402. "It was both pleasantly and wisely said by a nuncio of the Pope, returning from a certain nation where he served as lieger, whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they did not send one who was too wise, because no very wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do. And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends and more compass-reaches than are."—Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, book ii.

406.

The constraint we put on ourselves to remain faithful to a person we love is scarcely better than an infidelity.

407.

Our actions are like "bouts rimes," which every one makes refer to whatever he pleases.

408.

The desire of talking of ourselves, and of making our faults appear in the light we wish them, constitute a great part of our sincerity.

409.

We ought only to be astonished that we are still able to be astonished.

410.

Men are almost equally difficult to satisfy when they have very much love, and when they have scarcely any left.

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408. "Les hommes parlent de manière sur ce qui les regarde qu'ils n'avouent d'eux-mêmes que de petits défauts, et encore ceux qui supposent en leur personnes de beaux talens ou de grandes qualités."—La Bruyere, *De l'homme.*

411.

There are few people who are more often in the wrong than those who cannot endure to be so.

412.

A fool has not stuff enough to be good.

413.

If vanity does not entirely overthrow the virtues, at least it makes them all totter.

414.

What renders the vanity of others insupportable, is that it wounds our own.

415.

Men more easily renounce their interests than their tastes.

416.

Fortune never appears so blind as she does to those on whom she confers no favors.

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414. See No. 35. "Vanity calculates but poorly on the vanity of others; what a virtue we should distil from frailty, what a world of pain we should save our brethren, if we would suffer our own weakness to be the measure of theirs."—Bulwer Lytton.

417.

We should manage our fortune as we do our health—enjoy it when good, be patient when it is bad, and never apply violent remedies except in an extreme necessity.

418.

Rusticity is sometimes got rid of in the camp, but never at the court.

419.

A man may be more cunning than another, but not more cunning than all others.

420.

We are sometimes less unhappy in being deceived by those we love than in being undeceived by them.

421.

The first lover is kept a long time—when a second is not taken.

422.

We have not courage to say, as a general

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419. "Singuli decipere ac decipi possunt, nemo omnes, omnes neminem fefellerunt."—PLINY, *Paneg.*

proposition, that we have no faults, and our enemies have no good qualities; but, in detail, we are not far from thinking so.

423.

Of all our faults, that which we most readily admit is indolence. We persuade ourselves that it cherishes all the peaceful virtues; and that, without entirely destroying the others, it merely suspends their functions.

424.

There is a kind of elevation which does not depend on fortune. It is a certain air which distinguishes us, and seems to destine us for great things; it is a price which we imperceptibly set on ourselves. By this quality we usurp the deference of other men; and it puts us, in general, more above them than birth, dignity, or even merit itself.

425.

There is merit without elevation, but there is no elevation without some merit.

426.

Elevation is to merit what dress is to a handsome person.

427.

The quality least met with in gallantry is love.

428.

Fortune sometimes makes use of our faults in order to elevate us; and there are some troublesome people whose merit would be badly rewarded if we were not very glad to purchase their absence.

429.

It seems that Nature has concealed at the bottom of our minds, talents and abilities of which we are not aware. The passions alone have the privilege of bringing them to light, and of giving us sometimes views more certain and more perfect than art could possibly produce.

430.

We arrive complete novices at the different ages of life, and we often want experience in spite of the number of our years.

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430. "Nunquam ita quisquam bene subducta ratione ad vitam fuit,
Quin res, ætas, usus semper aliquid apportet, novi,

431.

Coquettes make a merit of being jealous of their lovers, to conceal their being envious of other women.

432.

Those who are over-reached by our cunning are far from appearing to us as ridiculous as we appear to ourselves when the cunning of others has over-reached us.

433.

The most dangerous weakness of old people who have been amiable is to forget that they are no longer so.

434.

We should often be ashamed of our best

Aliquid moneat, ut illa, quæ te scire credas, nescias,
Et quæ tibi putaris prima, in experiundo ut repudies."
TERENCE, *Adelph.* Act v. Scene 4, verse 1.

"To most men experience is like the stern lights of a ship which illumine only the track it has passed."—COLERIDGE.

434. "Useful and honorable as his genius has been to Ireland, that happy illustration of the machinery of most

actions if the world could see all the motives which produced them.

435.

The greatest effort of friendship is not to show our own faults to a friend, but to make him see his own.

436.

We have few faults which are not more excusable than the means we take to conceal them.

437.

Whatever disgrace we have merited, it is

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human motives, 'une roue de cuivre fait tourner une aiguille d'or,' may without much injustice be applied to those of Swift—as English discontent was, after all, the 'roue de cuivre' that put the 'aiguille d'or' of his patriotism in motion."—MOORE, *Capt. Rock*, book ii. chap. 6.

"Percez jusque dans les motifs des actions les plus éclatantes et des plus grands évènemens, tout en est brillant au dehors, vous voyez le héros: entrez plus avant, cherchez l'homme lui-même; c'est là que vous ne trouverez plus que de la cendre et de la boue. L'ambition, la témérité, le hasard, la crainte souvent, et le désespoir ont donné les plus grands spectacles, et les évènemens les plus brillans à la terre. Ce sont souvent les plus vils ressorts qui nous font marcher vers la gloire, et presque toujours les voies qui nous y ont conduits nous en dégradent elles-mêmes."—MASSILLON, *Petit Carême*.

almost always in our power to re-establish our reputation.

438.

A man does not please long when he has only one species of wit.

439.

Madmen and fools see only through their humor.

440.

Our wit sometimes enables us to commit follies with impunity.

441.

The vivacity which augments with years is not far from folly.

442.

In love, he who is earliest cured is always best cured.

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438. M. Segrais says that this maxim was aimed at Boileau and Racine.

441. "How ill gray hairs become the fool and jester!"
SHAKSPEARE.

442. "Quisque in primo obstitit,
Repulitque amorem, tutus ac victor fuit,
Qui blandiendo dulce nutrivit malum,
Sero recusat ferre quod subiit jugum."
SENECA, *Hippolyt.*

443.

Young women who do not wish to appear coquettes, and men of advanced age who do not wish to appear ridiculous, should never speak of love as a thing with which they can have any thing to do.

444.

We may appear great in an employment beneath our merit, but we often appear little in ones too great for us.

445.

Confidence contributes more than wit to conversation.

446.

All the passions make us commit faults, but love makes us commit the most ridiculous ones.

447.

We often fancy that we have constancy in our misfortunes, while we have nothing but depression of spirit; and we endure them without looking them in the face, as cowards suffer themselves to be killed through fear of defending themselves.

448.

Few people know how to be old.

449.

We often take credit for faults opposite to those we have; when we are weak we boast of being obstinate.

450.

Penetration has an air of divination, which flatters our vanity more than all the other qualities of the mind.

451.

The grace of novelty, and long habit, however opposite they may be, equally prevent our perceiving the faults of our friends.

452.

The generality of friends disgust us with friendship, and the generality of devotees disgust us with devotion.

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451. "Deux choses toutes contraires nous préviennent également—l'habitude et la nouveauté."—La Bruyere, *Des Jugemens.*

453.

We easily pardon in our friends those faults which do not concern ourselves.

454.

Women who love, more readily pardon great indiscretions than little infidelities.

455.

In the old age of love, as in that of life, we still live for its evils, but no longer for its pleasures.

456.

Nothing so much prevents our being natural as the desire of appearing so.

457.

To praise good actions heartily is in some sort to take part in them.

458.

The truest mark of being born with great qualities is being born without envy.

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455. Mr. Hazlitt remarks of friendship that "its youth is better than its old age."—*Characteristics*, 229.

458. "Nemo alienæ virtuti invidet qui satis confidit suæ."—CICERO, *in M. Anton.*

459.

When our friends have deceived us, we owe nothing but indifference to the proofs of their friendship, but we always owe sensibility to their misfortunes.

460.

Fortune and humor govern the world.

461.

It is more easy to become acquainted with men in general, than with any man in particular.

462.

We should not judge of a man's merit by his good qualities, but by the use he can make of them.

463.

There is a certain lively gratitude which not only acquits us of the obligations we have received, but by paying what we owe them makes our friends indebted to us.

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463. "And understood not that a grateful mind
By owing owes not, but is at once
Indebted and discharged."

MILTON, *Paradise Lost.*

464.

We should desire few things ardently if we had a perfect knowledge of what we were desiring.

465.

What causes the majority of women to be so little touched by friendship is, that it is insipid when they have once tasted of love.

466.

In friendship, as in love, we are often more happy from the things we are ignorant of, than from those we are acquainted with.

467.

We endeavor to make a merit of faults that we are unwilling to correct.

468.

The most violent passions leave us some

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464. "Quid tam dextro pede concipis, ut te
Conatûs non pœniteat votique peracti."
JUVENAL, *Sat.* 10.

465. "Celui qui a eu l'expérience d'un grand amour neglige l'amitié; et celui qui est épuisé sur l'amitié n'a encore rien fait pour l'amour."—LA BRUYERE, *Du Cœur.*

moments of relaxation, but vanity always agitates us.

469.

Old fools are more foolish than young ones.

470.

Weakness is more opposed to virtue than vice is.

471.

What renders the pangs of shame and of jealousy so acute is, that vanity cannot help us to support them.

472.

Propriety is the least of all laws, and the most obeyed.

473.

The pomp of funerals is more interesting to

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469. *Malvolio.* "Infirmity that decays the wise doth ever make the better fool." *Clown.* "God send you, sir, a speedy infirmity, for the better increasing your folly."—SHAKSPEARE, *Twelfth Night.* This maxim of La Rochefoucauld's seems to have passed into the proverb, "No fool like an old fool."

473. "Curatio funeris, conditio sepulturæ, pompa exequiarum, magis sunt vivorum solatia quam subsidia mortuorum."—ST. AUGUSTINE, *de Civitate Dei*, i. 12.

the vanity of the living than to the memory of the dead.

474.

A well-regulated mind has less difficulty in submitting to ill-regulated ones than in governing them.

475.

When fortune surprises us by bestowing on us an important office, without having conducted us to it by degrees, or without our

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There is an amusing exemplification of this maxim in the account of the funeral of Gil Blas' father. "'Beware,' said my mother, 'of making a pompous burial; it cannot be too modest for my husband, whom all the world knew to be a very indigent usher.' 'Madam,' replied Scipio, 'had he been still more needy than he was, I would not abate two farthings of the expense; for in this I regard my master only,—he has been the Duke of Lerma's favorite, and his father ought to be nobly interred.' I approved of my secretary's design, and even desired him to spare no cost; the remains of vanity which I still preserved broke out on this occasion. I flattered myself that in being at a great expense upon a father who left me no inheritance, I should make the world admire my generous behavior. My mother for her part, whatever modesty she affected, was not ill pleased to see her husband buried in splendor. We therefore gave a *carte blanche* to Scipio, who without loss of time took all necessary measures for a superb funeral." —Book x. ch. 2. Jarvis' trans.

being elevated to it by our hopes, it is almost impossible that we should sustain ourselves in it with propriety, and appear worthy of possessing it.

476.

Our pride is often increased by what we retrench from our other faults.

477.

There are no fools so troublesome as those who have some wit.

478.

There is no man who thinks himself in any of his qualities inferior to the man he esteems the most in the world.

479.

In important affairs we ought not so much to apply ourselves to create opportunities, as to make use of those which present themselves.

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476. Thus Gibbon remarks of the early Christians, that "the loss of sensual pleasure was supplied and compensated by spiritual pride."—*Decline and Fall*, ch, xv.

479. Bacon on the contrary says, "A wise man will make more opportunities than he finds."—*Essay* 52.

480.

It would seldom be a bad bargain for us to renounce the praise, on condition of escaping the censure of the world.

481.

Whatever disposition the world may have to judge incorrectly, it more often shows favor to false, than injustice to true, merit.

482.

We sometimes see a fool with wit, but never one with judgment.

483.

We should gain more by letting ourselves be seen such as we are, than by attempting to appear what we are not.

484.

Our enemies come nearer the truth in their judgments of us, than we do in our judgments of ourselves.

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480. "Enfin qui que nous soyons, grand, peuple, prince, sujet, la situation la plus à souhaiter pour notre vanité, c'est d'ignorer ce que le monde pense de nous."—MASSILLON, *Serm. de la Toussaint.*

485.

There are many cures for love, but none of them infallible.

486.

We are very far from knowing all that our passions make us do.

487.

Old age is a tyrant, which prohibits all the pleasures of youth upon pain of death.

488.

The same pride which makes us censure the faults from which we fancy ourselves exempt, induces us to despise the good qualities which we want.

489.

There is an excess of good and evil which passes our sensibility.

490.

Innocence is very far from finding as much protection as crime.

491.

Of all violent passions, that which sits least ill on women is love.

492.

Vanity makes us commit more faults against our taste than reason does.

493.

There are some bad qualities which make great talents.

494.

Men never wish ardently for what they only wish for from reason.

495.

There is often more pride than goodness in our sorrow for the misfortunes of our enemies; it is to make them feel that we are superior to them that we give them marks of our compassion.

496.

All our qualities are uncertain and doubtful, as well in good as in evil, and they are almost always at the mercy of conjunctures.

497.

In their first passions women love the lover, in the others they love love.

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497. Byron has translated this maxim, *Don Juan*, canto 3.

498.

Pride has its oddities as well as other passions; men are ashamed to avow that they are jealous, and yet take a pride in having been and in being capable of becoming so.

499.

Rare as is true love, true friendship is still rarer.

500.

There are few women whose merit outlives their beauty.

501.

The desire of being pitied, or admired, often makes the greatest part of our confidence.

502.

The same firmness which serves to resist love serves also to render it violent and dura-

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"In her first passion woman loves her lover,
In all the others what she loves, is love."

"On n'aime véritablement qu'une fois, c'est la première, les passions qui suivent sont moins involontaires."—La Bruyere, *Du Cœur.*

499. "Il est plus ordinaire de voir un amour extrême qu'une parfaite amitié."—La Bruyere, *Du Cœur.*

ble, and weak persons who are always agitated by passions are scarcely ever really taken up with it.

503.

Imagination cannot invent so many different contrarieties as naturally exist in the heart of every individual.

504.

Our envy always outlives the happiness of those we envy.

505.

It is only persons of firmness that can have real gentleness; those who appear gentle are in general only of a weak character, which easily changes into asperity.

506.

Timidity is a fault for which it is dangerous to reprove persons whom we wish to correct of it.

507.

Nothing is so rare as real goodness of heart; even those who fancy they are possessed of it, have in general only complaisance or weakness of character.

508.

Men are more satirical from vanity than from malice.

509.

The mind attaches itself from indolence and from constancy to whatever is easy and agreeable to it. This habit always sets limits to our knowledge, and no one ever took the trouble to enlarge and guide his mind to the extent of its capacities.

510.

When the heart is still agitated by the remains of a passion, we are more ready to receive a new one than when we are entirely cured.

511.

Those who have had great passions find themselves during the whole of their lives both happy and unhappy at being cured of them.

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508. "It is often observed of wits that they will lose their best friends for the sake of a joke. Candor may discern that it is their greater degree of the love of fame, not the less degree of their benevolence, which is the cause."—SHENSTONE, *Men and Manners.*

512.

There are even more people without interest than without envy.

513.

We have more indolence in the mind than in the body.

514.

Of all our passions, that which is most unknown to ourselves is indolence. Although the injuries it causes are very imperceptible, no other passion is more ardent or more malignant. If we consider attentively its influence we shall see that on every occasion it renders itself master of our sentiments, our interests, and our pleasures; it is the remora which arrests the course of the largest vessels, a calm more dangerous to the most important affairs than rocks or tempests. The repose of indolence is a secret spell of the mind which suspends our most ardent pursuits and our firmest resolves.

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512. See note to No. 28. for Mandeville's opinion as to the universality of envy. "There is but one man who can believe himself free from envy, and it is he who has never examined his own heart."—HELVETIUS.

515.

The calm or agitation of our temper does not depend so much on the important events of life, as on an agreeable or disagreeable adjustment of little things which happen every day.

516.

However wicked men may be, they dare not appear to be enemies of virtue; and when they wish to persecute it, they pretend to believe that it is false, or suppose it capable of crimes.

517.

Men often proceed from love to ambition, but they seldom return from ambition to love.

518.

Extreme avarice almost always mistakes itself; there is no passion which more often

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517. "Les hommes commencent par l'amour, finissent par l'ambition, et ne se trouvent dans une assiette plus tranquille, que lorsqu'ils meurent."—La Bruyere, *Du Cœur.*

"He who admits ambition to the companionship of love, admits a giant that outstrides the gentler footsteps of its comrade."—Sir E. B. Lytton, *Harold.*

deprives itself of its object, nor on which the present exercises so much power to the prejudice of the future.

519.

Avarice often produces opposite effects; there is an infinite number of people who sacrifice all their property to doubtful and distant expectations; others despise great future advantages to obtain present interests of a trifling nature.

520.

It would seem that men do not find enough defects in themselves; they augment the number by certain singular qualities which they affect to put on, and these they cultivate with so much assiduity, that they become at length natural defects which are no longer capable of correction.

521.

One fact which lets us see that men are better acquainted with their faults than is generally thought, is, that they are never wrong when they speak of their own conduct; the same self-love which generally blinds, on such occasions enlightens them, and gives them views so just as to make them suppress or dis-

guise the least things which might be condemned.

522

Young people on entering the world should be either timid or giddy; a composed and settled demeanor generally changes into impertinence.

523.

Quarrels would not last long, if the fault was only on one side.

524.

It is of no advantage to a woman to be young without being pretty, or to be pretty without being young.

525.

There are some persons so fickle and frivolous, that they are as far from having real faults as solid qualities.

526.

A woman's first gallantry is not generally reckoned until she has had a second.

527.

There are some people so full of themselves, that when they are in love, they find means to

be occupied with their passion, without being so with the person they love.

528.

Love, all agreeable as it is, is more pleasing from the manner in which it displays itself than from its own nature.

529.

A small degree of wit accompanied by good sense is less tiresome in the long run than a great amount of wit without it.

530.

Jealousy is the greatest of all evils, and the least pitied by those who cause it.

531.

Great souls are not those which have less passion and more virtue than common souls, but those only which have greater designs.

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529. "You know, Mr. Spectator, that a man of wit may extremely affect one for the present, but if he has not discretion his merit soon vanishes away: while a wise man that has not so great a stock of wit, shall nevertheless give you a far greater and more lasting satisfaction."—*Spectator*, No. 244.

532.

Natural ferocity makes fewer cruel people than self-love.

533.

To be always good others must believe that they can never appear wicked to us with impunity.

534.

When we cannot find contentment in ourselves, it is useless to seek it elsewhere.

535.

Those who are incapable of committing

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534. "Navibus atque
Quadrigis petimus bene vivere; quod petis, hic est,
Est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit æquus."
HORACE, *Ep.* i. 11, 28.

See also *Od.* ii. 16, 19:—

"Patriæ quis exul
Se quoque fugit?"

Which Byron apparently had in view in his song to Inez, *Childe Harold*, canto i.

"What exile from himself can flee?
To zones though more and more remote,
Still, still pursues, where'er I be,
The blight of life—the demon Thought."

great crimes do not easily suspect others of them.

536.

To be confident of pleasing is often an infallible means of displeasing.

537.

In mankind is not found any great excess either of good or evil.

538.

There is a kind of revolution of so general a character that it changes the mental tastes as well as the fortunes of the world.

539.

We do not always regret the loss of friends in consideration of their merit, but in consideration of our wants, and of the good opinion they entertained of us.

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535. "Whose nature is so far from doing harm,
That he suspects none."—*King Lear.*

Montaigne remarks, that "Confidence in another man's virtue is no slight evidence of a man's own;" and he adds, "God is pleased to favor such confidence."

536. M. Brotier, in his edition, reads "Moyen infaillible de *plaire.*

540.

The generality of women yield through weakness rather than through passion. Hence it is that enterprising men succeed generally better than others, although they may not be the most amiable.

541.

After having spoken of the falsity of so many apparent virtues it is reasonable to say something of the falsity of the contempt of death; I mean that contempt of death which the Pagans boast of deriving from their own strength, without the hope of a better life. There is a difference between enduring death with firmness, and despising it. The first is

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540. "Brisk confidence still best with woman copes,
Pique her and soothe in turn, soon passion crowns thy hopes.
BYRON, *Childe Harold*, canto ii. 34.

La Bruyère also has a severe, but graphic, description of the class of men who succeed best with women, "A un homme vain, indiscret, qui est grand parleur et mauvais plaisant; qui parle de soi avec confiance et des autres avec mépris; impétueux, altier, *entreprenant;* sans mœurs ni probité; de nul jugement et d'une imagination très libre; il ne lui manque plus, pour être adoré de bien des femmes, que de beaux traits et la taille belle."—*Des Femmes.*

common enough, but the other in my opinion is never sincere. Every thing however has been written which could by possibility persuade us that death is not an evil, and the weakest men as well as heroes have given a thousand celebrated examples to support this opinion. Nevertheless, I doubt whether any man of good sense ever believed it, and the pains men take to persuade others and themselves of it let us see that the task is by no means easy. We may have many causes of disgust with life, but we never have any reason for despising death. Even those who destroy their own lives do not reckon it as such a little matter, and are as much alarmed at and recoil as much from it as others, when it comes upon them in a different way from the one they have chosen. The inequality remarkable in the courage of a vast number of brave men arises from the fact of death presenting itself in different shapes to their imagination, and appearing more instant at one time than at another. Thus it results that after having despised what they knew nothing of they end by fearing what they do know. If we would not believe that it is the greatest of all evils, we must avoid looking it and all its circumstances in the face. The cleverest and bravest are those who take

the most respectable pretexts to prevent themselves from reflecting on it; but any man who is able to view it in its reality finds it a horrible thing. The necessity of dying constituted all the firmness of the philosophers. They conceived they should go through with a good grace what they could not avoid, and as they were unable to make their lives eternal, they had nothing left for it but to make their reputations eternal, and preserve all that could be secured from the shipwreck. To put a good face on the matter, let us content ourselves with not discovering to ourselves all that we think of it, and let us hope more from our constitutions than from those feeble reasonings which would make us believe that we can approach death with indifference. The credit of dying with firmness; the hope of being regretted; the desire of leaving a fair reputation; the certainty of being freed from the miseries of life, and of no longer depending on the caprices of fortune, are remedies which we should not reject. But at the same time we should not believe that they are infallible. They do as much to assure us as a simple hedge in war does to assure those who have to approach a place to the fire of which they are exposed. At a distance it appears capable of affording a

shelter, but when near it is found to be a feeble defence. It is flattering ourselves to believe that death appears to us when near, what we fancied it at a distance, and that our sentiments, which are weakness itself, are of a temper so strong as not to suffer from the attack of the harshest of trials. It is also but a poor acquaintance with the effects of self-love, to think that it can aid us in treating lightly what must necessarily destroy itself, and reason, in which we think to find so many resources, is too weak in this encounter to persuade us of what we wish. On the contrary, it is reason which most frequently betrays us, and instead of inspiring us with the contempt of death serves to reveal to us all that it has dreadful and terrible. All that reason can do for us is to advise us to turn away our eyes from death, to fix them on other objects. Cato and Brutus chose illustrious ones. A lackey a short time ago amused himself with dancing on the scaffold on which he was about to be executed. Thus, though motives may differ, they often produce the same effects. So that it is true that whatever disproportion there may be between great men and common people, both the one and the other have been a thousand times seen to meet death with the same countenance

but it has been with this difference, that in the contempt which great men show for death it is the love of glory which hides it from their view; and in common people, it is an effect of their want of intelligence which prevents their being acquainted with the greatness of their loss, and leaves them at liberty to think of other things.

APPENDIX.

MAXIMS AND REFLECTIONS.

BY

STANISLAUS,

KING OF POLAND.

THE LIFE OF STANISLAUS.

Stanislaus was born at Leopold, October 20, 1677. His family name was Seczinski, and his father held the important post of grand treasurer to the Crown. He very early displayed indication of an amiable and estimable character, and at the age of twenty-two was intrusted with an embassy to the Ottoman court. In 1704, being then palatine of Posnania, and general of Great Poland, he was deputed, by the Assembly of the States at Warsaw, to wait upon Charles XII. of Sweden, who had invaded the kingdom, with a view of dethroning Augustus of Saxony. In a conference with the Swedish monarch, he so rapidly ac-

quired his esteem, that Charles immediately resolved to raise him to the throne of Poland, which he effected at an election, held in the presence of the Swedish generals, on the 27th of July, 1704, Stanislaus being then in his twenty-seventh year. He was, however, soon after driven from Warsaw, by his rival, Augustus; but another change brought him back to that capital, where he was crowned, with his wife, in October, 1705, and the next year, Augustus was compelled solemnly to abdicate. The fatal defeat of his patron, Charles XII. at Pultowa, in 1709, again obliged him to retreat into Sweden, where he endeavored to join Charles XII. at Bender, in disguise, but being detected, he was held captive in that town until 1714. Being then suffered to depart, he repaired to Deux Ponts, where he was joined by his family, and remained until the death of Charles XII. in 1719, when the court of France afforded him a retreat at Weissembourgh, in Alsace.

He remained in obscurity until 1725, when his daughter, the princess Mary, was unexpectedly selected as a wife, by Louis XV., king of France. On the death of Augustus in 1733, an attempt was made by the French court, to replace Stanislaus on the throne of Poland; but although he had a party who supported him and proclaimed him king, his competitor, the electoral prince of Saxony, being aided by the emperors of Germany and Russia, he was obliged to retire. He endured this like every other reverse of fortune, with great resignation, and at the peace of 1736, formally abdicated his claim to the kingdom of Poland,* on condition of retaining the title of king, and being put in

* The following are copies of the letters to the Polish Lords and the City of Dantzic, on his resignation of the sovereign power of Poland:—

possession for life of the duchies of Lorraine and Bar. Thenceforward he lived as the sovereign of a small country, which he rendered happy by the exercise of virtues which acquired him the appellation of Stanislaus the Beneficent. He not only relieved his people from the excessive imposts, but by strict economy was enabled to found many useful charitable establishments, and to patronize the arts and

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"*To my dear Primate, and the Polish Lords.*

"My grief in separating from you, my dear and true friends, speaks sufficiently to give you a sense of all I feel in this cruel moment. The forced resolution I take is only founded on the inutility of my sacrifice, as you have so judged yourselves. I embrace you all very tenderly, beginning by my Lord the Primate; and I beseech you by yourselves, and consequently by what is dearest to me, to unite more than ever for supporting, as much as possible, the interests of my dear country, which has no support but in you only.

"The tears that spread upon the words I write oblige me to leave off. May you at least read in the bottom of my heart the sentiments which your love for me has placed and graved in it for ever.

"I am, from my heart and soul,

"STANISLAUS, King."

"*Advice to my good City of Dantzic.*

"I depart when I can no longer remain with you, nor enjoy longer the testimonies of so unexampled a love and fidelity. I take along with me, with the regret for your sufferings, the grateful acknowledgments which I owe you, and of which I shall acquit myself at all times by all the means that may convince you of them. I wish you all the happiness you deserve; it will be my consolation amidst the distress that forces me from you.

"I am, and shall always be, and everywhere, your most affectionate,

"STANISLAUS, King."

sciences. He was himself attached to literature, and wrote various treatises on philosophy, morals, and politics, which were published under the title of "Œuvres du Philosophe Bienfaisant," 4 vols. 8vo., 1765. He died, much lamented, February 23, 1766, in consequence of the injury which he sustained from his night-gown being accidentally set on fire.

MAXIMS AND MORAL SENTENCES.

1.

The word of God proves the truth of religion; the corruption of man, its necessity; government, its advantages.

2.

Where religion speaks, reason has only a right to hear.

3.

Nothing but religion is capable of changing pains into pleasures.

4.

To make good use of life, one should have in youth the experience of advanced years, and in old age the vigor of youth.

5.

If we had a fore-feeling of the trouble of correcting ourselves, we should have none in keeping ourselves free from faults.

6.

In order to be applauded for what we do, we must not too much applaud ourselves.

7.

Hope makes time very long, and enjoyment very short.

8.

Long ailments wear out pain, and long hopes joy.

9.

Those who ought to be secure from calumny, are generally those who avoid it least.

10.

We wish no evil to those we despise; but those who have a right to despise us.

11.

We ought to be more offended at extravagant praise than injuries.

12.

It is more honorable to acknowledge our faults than boast of our merits.

13.

How can we love a life which leads to death, and byways always beset with thorns?

14.

Good-humor is the health of the soul, sadness its poison.

15.

Reason shows us our duty; he who can make us love our duty is more powerful than reason itself.

16.

An implacable hatred is a greater burden than we usually think it is.

17.

It is as natural to fear as to hope, when one is unfortunate.

18.

It is rare that an unfortunate person has friends, and still more rare that he has relations.

19.

I believe, indeed, that it is more laudable to suffer great misfortunes than to do great things.

20.

Fortune sells herself at a dear rate to those who seek after her; but often courts to her those who seem less solicitous about her favors.

21.

Modesty ought to be the virtue of those who are deficient in other virtues.

22.

Praises are satire when insincere.

23.

Almost always the most indigent are the most generous.

24.

The idea of happiness is often more flattering than the happiness itself.

25.

The ties of friendship are at present so slight, that they break of themselves; they

only draw hearts near each other, but do not unite them.

26.

A hard and polished piece of marble reflects the objects that are presented before it. The same may be said of most men. The troubles of another skim over the surface of their soul, but go no farther.

27.

A man greater than his misfortunes shows he was not deserving of them.

28.

The courage which emulation inspires for an enterprise soon finds the means of succeeding.

29.

To cease hearing a babbler is the surest way to make him hold his tongue.

30.

The desire of pleasing is not laudable, but so far as we endeavor at the same time to make ourselves esteemed.

31.

To live in quiet, we should undertake noth-

ing difficult; but presumption makes all things to be thought easy.

32.

If there be inevitable dangers, there are many we give into by imprudence, and still more which we may avoid by a little precaution.

33.

The instability of our tastes is the occasion of the irregularity of our lives.

34.

No other princes commonly, but those who are deserving of immortality, love to encourage the talents that give a right to it.

35.

It is not possible to impose silence on the interior voice that upbraids us with our faults. It is the voice of nature herself.

36.

Religion has nothing more to fear than not being sufficiently understood.

37.

Must one cease to be virtuous to escape being exposed to the darts of envy? What a

calamity would it be if the sun ceased shining, that weak eyes might not be offended!

38.

The older love grows the weaker it is. Friendship is stronger in becoming old.

39.

Nature cries aloud to the most powerful, as well as the most abject of men, that they are all members of the same body.

40.

If we perceive at present little genius, it is because the arts have few inventors in an age where they are so many models.

41.

The most infallible mark of ignorance is superstition.

42.

Who of us would take notice of time if it did not pass away? But great is our mishap not to think of it till the moment it flies away and escapes us.

43.

Science, when well digested, is nothing but good sense and reason.

44.

Why should we despise those who have no wit? it is not a voluntary evil in them.

45.

There are few persons of greater worth than their reputation; but how many are there whose worth is far short of their reputation.

46.

A great soul ought to be more sensible of benefits than affronts.

47.

However great a happiness is, there is still one greater, which is that of being esteemed worthy of the happiness that is enjoyed.

48.

We ought to reckon time by our good actions, and place the rest to the account of our not having lived.

49.

Though hope often deceives us we have still the same confidence, and our life passes away in hoping.

50.

It scarce ever happens, that in falling from a high elevation, we find in ourselves so much strength to rise again, as we had weakness in falling.

51.

All nature acts for growing, and all growth for its destruction.

52.

The virtue that excites envy has, at least, the advantage of confounding, sooner or later, the envious.

53.

Modesty is always inseparable from true merit.

54.

It is one of the great effects of Providence, that every nation, however miserable it may be, fancies that happiness cannot be found elsewhere.

55.

The best way for some to console themselves for their ignorance is, to believe useless all that they do not know.

56.

Can princes born in palaces be sensible of the misery of those who dwell in cottages?

57.

Patriotism is nothing more than the sentiment of our welfare, and the dread of seeing it disturbed.

58.

Every thing, even piety, is dangerous in a man without judgment.

59.

Reason has an occasion for experience; but experience is useless without reason.

60.

Conscience admonishes as a friend, before punishing us as a judge.

61.

To believe with certainty we must begin with doubting.

62.

I cannot comprehend how deceit is so cried down, and, at the same time, so common.

There is no man but is afraid of being deceived, and yet, on the least opportunity, endeavors to deceive others.

63.

I would be glad that there was a less distance between the people and the great. The people then, not believing the great to be greater than they are, would fear them less; and the great, not imagining the people more insignificant and miserable than they are, would fear them more.

64.

If beauty knew all the advantages of the modesty that heightens its charms, it would not constantly expose it to so many dangers.

65.

Why fly from the unhappy? Their state makes us more sensible of the value of the happiness we possess.

66.

To suppose courage in a coward, is to inspire him with courage in effect.

67.

To make the principle of our conduct consist in the necessity of duty, is to make it very

hard and painful, and to expose ourselves constantly to the desire of breaking through it.

68.

How many people make every thing their business, because they know not how to occupy themselves in any thing.

69.

Experience, acquired by faults, is a very costly master.

70.

We are fond of conversing with those we love, why therefore cannot man, who loves himself so well, remain a moment with himself.

71.

Is it not astonishing that the love of repose keeps us in continual agitation?

72.

In all sorts of government man is made to believe himself free, and to be in chains.

73.

The less we require from others the more we obtain. To exercise authority too much is the way to lose it.

74.

He who possesses a great deal is not the most happy; it is he who desires little, and knows how to enjoy it.

75.

The advice given to princes is usually of service to those only who give it.

76.

Nothing is of so great consequence to us as to preserve our reputation; once lost, it is never recovered.

77.

Men and women, in marrying, make a vow of loving one another. Would it not be better for their happiness if they made a vow of pleasing one another?

78.

As soon as in conversation we have perceived the result of the mind of those with whom we speak, we should stop there. All that is said further, being no longer comprehended, might pass for ridiculous.

79.

The people are always attentive to seize upon the weak side of a great reputation.

80.

What makes so many persons go astray in their arguments, is that they would fain think beyond the extent of their intellects.

81.

The desire of doing well is debased by the desire of appearing to have done well.

82.

It is rare that coxcombs have not at first the ascendant in every assembly. It is mud that rises on the surface of the water, till, the agitation ceasing, it precipitates itself.

83.

There is nowhere so much occasion for good humor as in courts, and yet there we find the least of it.

84.

It is hardly possible to suspect another, without having in one's self the seeds of baseness the party is accused of.

85.

Esteem has more engaging charms than friendship, and even love. It captivates hearts better, and never makes ingrates.

86.

Vanity is less insupportable than affected modesty.

87.

I esteem an honest man who is sensible in regard to glory. I esteem him no longer when he is captivated with vanity.

88.

There are few friends but admit of advice, but scarce any who can abide censure.

89.

By showing too much dread of being deceived, we often discover the manner whereby we may be deceived.

90.

We usually take a confidant to have an approver.

91.

The earnest desire of succeeding is almost always a prognostic of success.

92.

Whoever places importance in little things is subject to treat slightly the most essential.

93.

Many misers prefer, to the shame of appearing such, the punishment of being profuse.

94.

A covetous person is seldom cured for the passion of gaming. Besides the hopes of gain, he finds in it the advantage of hiding his avarice under an air of disinterestedness.

95.

We are usually mistaken in esteeming men too much; rarely in esteeming them too little.

96.

A man in place has no more friends when he loses his post. It was not, therefore, him, but his place that had friends.

97.

When truth offends no one, it ought to pass out of the mouth as naturally as the air we breathe.

98.

If, with the pains we endure here below we were immortal, we should be the most miserable of all beings. It is sweet and pleasing to hope that we shall not live always.

99.

It seems that all we do is but a rough draught, and that always something remains to be done to make the work complete.

100.

Power is not always proportionate to the will. One should be consulted before the other; but the majority of men begin by willing, and act afterward as they can.

101.

Affectation discovers sooner what one is, than it makes known what one would fain appear to be.

102.

Laziness is a premature death. To be in no action, is not to live.

103.

Great wants proceed from great wealth, and make riches almost equal to poverty.

104.

We feel death but once. He who fears death dies every time he thinks of it.

105.

A miser of sixty years old refuses himself necessaries that he may not want them when he is a hundred. Almost all of us make ourselves unhappy by too much forecast.

106.

Nature does not accustom us to suffer from our infancy, but in order to teach us to suffer.

107.

It is happy for human nature that there are desires which cannot be satisfied. Otherwise, the most sorry man would make himself master of the world.

108.

He that keeps his promise only to his own advantage, is scarce more bound than if he had promised nothing. Every promise of interest vanishes as soon as the interest ceases.

109.

I esteem greatly the ignorance of a man,

who believes and confesses his knowledge to be confined to what he knows.

110.

None are rash, when they are not seen by any body.

111.

Man is only weak by the disproportion there is between what he can, and what he is willing to do. The only way he has to increase his strength, is to retrench many of his desires.

112.

Interested benefits are so common, that we need not be astonished if ingratitude is so rare.

113.

We only hate the wicked through interest. If they did us no injury we should look upon them with indifference.

114.

The people most attached to life are almost always those who know least how to enjoy it.

115.

The misfortune of the most learned is not

to know that they are ignorant of what they cannot know.

116.

Too much devotion leads to fanaticism; too much philosophy to irreligion.

117.

The care we take not to suffer, causes more torment than we should find in supporting what we suffer.

118.

We meet with great difficulty in conquering pride by resisting it: how potent, then, must it be, when flattered?

119.

As we cannot hinder young people from being inconsiderate, we should remember that they have but a short time to be so.

120.

The generality of misers are very good people; they do not cease to amass wealth for others that wish their death.

121.

Life is enjoyed only by bits and scraps:

every instant terminates its extent: when it exists, the past is no more, and the instant that follows is not yet. In this manner we die without ever having been able to enjoy one instant.

122.

The hypocrite who would fain imitate virtue, can only copy it in water-colors.

123.

It is having in some measure a sort of wit, to know how to use the wit of others.

124.

The indolence of the generality of the great, borders somewhat upon a lethargic state.

125.

I doubt whether a wise and sensible man would become young again, on the same conditions he once was so.

126.

The prejudices of youth pass away with it. Those of old age last only, because there is no other age to be hoped for.

127.

The reason why some people speak so much is, that they speak only by memory.

128.

The poor, condemned to the sweat of the brow and to fatigue, upbraid nature with the sloth of the rich; and the rich, tormented by passions, or devoured by disgust and irksomeness, envy the innocent pleasure of the poor. None here below find themselves happy but in the place of others.

129.

We wish no evil to those we despise, but to those who have a right to despise us.

130.

How many prodigals are there, who, by dying, pay only nature what they owe her!

131.

We mount to fortune by several steps, but require only one step to come down.

132.

There are authors who take so much pains

with, and polish so much their writings, that all they give to the public are nothing but mere dust and filings.

133.

The first faults alarm innocence: those that follow cease to fright her. Happy that innocence which has not learned to fear, or has held to her first fears.

134.

I know no real worth but that tranquil firmness which seeks dangers by duty, and braves them without rashness.

135.

I pity less an ignorant person who knows nothing, than one who knows but indifferently what he has learned. It is much better to know thoroughly than to know a great deal.

136.

The man of understanding reasons only according to what he has learned; but the man of genius according to himself.

137.

It does not suit all persons to be modest; none but great men ought to be so.

138.

The merit of great men is not understood, but by those who are formed to be such themselves: genius speaks only to genius.

139.

Great men are in vain criticised; their illustrious qualities are sufficient to procure them revenge.

140.

Great speakers resemble those musicians, who, in their airs, prefer noise to harmony.

141.

We may recover out of the darkness of ignorance, but never out of that of presumption.

142.

We have known how to make the elements obsequious to our ingenuity, but we know not how to master our passions.

143.

True valor braves danger without neglecting resources.

144.

Two sorts of men do not reflect, the terrified and the rash man.

MAXIMS TO LIVE BY.

1.

Avoid, if possible, laying yourself under an obligation to a purse-proud man, whose wealth is his only distinction, and who, thanks to some lucky star, has risen from a menial station in society to one of comparative opulence and importance. If your miserable fate dooms you to receive the slightest pecuniary favor from such a person, he is almost sure to treat you with insolence and contumely, and to profit by the opportunity to take liberties with you, which, under other circumstances, he would not dare to attempt.

2.

We lose our friends at the flood-tide of our prosperity, not less frequently than at its ebb; the two extremes are equally fatal. In the former case they grow distant and reserved, in

order to shield themselves from the coldness they have reason to anticipate from us; and in the latter, they desert us because we have ceased to have it in our power to be useful to them.

3.

Politeness has been defined to be artificial good nature; but we may affirm, with much greater propriety, that good nature is natural politeness.

4.

Success affords us the means of securing additional success; as the possession of capital enables us to increase our pecuniary gains.

5.

It is after the hey-day of passion has subsided, that our most deservedly celebrated writers have produced their *chef d'œuvres;* as it is after the eruption of a volcano that the land in its vicinity is usually the most fertile.

6.

Before you purchase any superfluity upon credit, ask yourself this very simple question: Should I be disposed to pay the cost of this article, at the present moment, supposing I

could obtain it on no other terms? If you decide in the negative, by all means forego its possession; for this test ought to have satisfied you that you are about to buy that of which, in reality, you have no need.

7.

Avoid, if possible, receiving an obligation which you have reason to believe you will never have it in your power to repay.

8.

You must not expect that conviction will follow, immediately, the detection of error, any more than that the waves of the sea will cease to heave the instant the storm has subsided.

9.

There are few defects in our nature so glaring as not to be veiled from observation by politeness and good breeding.

10.

It is a fallacy to suppose that an author must appear frequently before the public in order to retain the station to which his writings may have elevated him. The silence of the man of genius is far more respected by the

public than the feverish loquacity of the most industrious dealer in commonplaces.

11.

What is fame? The advantage of being known by people of whom you yourself know nothing, and for whom you care as little.

12.

A man may be possessed of a tolerable number of ideas without being a wit; as an officer may have a large body of soldiers under his command without being a good general. In either case it is equally difficult to know how to discipline and employ one's forces.

13.

Women of lofty imagination are placed in a very awkward predicament as regards the adaptation of their literary powers. Considering their opportunities, the marvel is less that women have not oftener surpassed the coarser sex in their productions, but that they have ever excelled them at all.

14.

Forgive the premeditated insult of a plebeian who pleads his ignorance in extenuation

of his brutality; but do not so forget it as to allow the offender to come into personal contact with you again. Keep him, for ever afterwards, at an inexorable distance.

15.

A well-read fool is the most pestilent of blockheads: his learning is a flail which he knows not how to handle, and with which he breaks his neighbor's shins as well as his own. Keep a fellow of this description at arm's length, as you value the integrity of your bones.

16.

I think it is Pope who has somewhere remarked, that to purchase books indiscriminately, because they may happen to have the name of an eminent publisher attached to them, is just as absurd as it would be to buy clothes which do not fit you, because they happen to have been made by a fashionable tailor.

17.

To lie under obligations to our friends for benefits really conferred is not always pleasant; but to have our thanks extorted, by anticipation, by promises of civility which are

doomed never to be performed, is one of the most disagreeable penalties that can be inflicted upon man. The only way to avoid being bamboozled out of your thanks, by promises of prospective kindness, is to return your acknowledgments provisionally.

TRAITS OF MORAL COURAGE IN EVERY-DAY LIFE.

HAVE the courage to discharge a debt, while you have got the money in your pocket.

Have the courage to do without that which you do not need, however much you may admire it.

Have the courage to speak your mind when it is necessary that you should do so, and to hold your tongue when it is better that you should be silent.

Have the courage to speak to a friend in a "seedy" coat, even in the street, and when a rich one is nigh; the effort is less than many people take it to be, and the act is worthy a king.

Have the courage to set down every penny you spend, and add it up *weekly*.

Have the courage to pass your host's lackey at the door, without giving him a shilling,

when you know you cannot afford it, and, what is more, that the man has not earned it.

Have the courage to own that you are poor, and you disarm poverty of its sharpest sting.

Have the courage to laugh at your personal defects, and the world will be deprived of that pleasure, by being reminded of their own.

Have the courage to admit that you have been in the wrong, and you will remove the fact from the mind of others, putting a desirable impression in the place of an unfavorable one.

Have the courage to adhere to a first resolution, when you cannot change it for a better, and to abandon it at the eleventh hour, upon conviction.

Have the courage to acknowledge your age to a day, and to compare it with the average life of man. Have the courage to make a will, and, what is more, a *just* one.

Have the courage to face a difficulty, lest it kick you harder than you bargain for: difficulties, like thieves, often disappear at a glance.

Have the courage to avoid accommodation bills, however badly you want money; and to

decline pecuniary assistance from your dearest friend.

Have the courage to shut your eyes at the prospect of large profits, and to be content with small ones.

Have the courage to tell a man why you will not lend him your money; he will respect you more than if you tell him you can't.

Have the courage to "cut" the most agreeable acquaintance you possess, when he convinces you that he lacks principle: "a friend should bear with a friend's infirmities"—not his vices.

Have the courage to show your preference for honesty, in whatever guise it appears; and your contempt for vice, surrounded by attractions.

Have the courage to give, occasionally, that which you can ill afford to spare; giving what you do not want nor value, neither brings nor deserves thanks in return; who is grateful for a drink of water from another's overflowing well, however delicious the draught?

Have the courage to wear your old garments till you can pay for new ones.

Have the courage to obey your Maker, at the risk of being ridiculed by man.

Have the courage to wear thick boots in winter, and to insist upon your wife and daughters doing the like.

Have the courage to acknowledge ignorance of any kind; every body will immediately doubt you, and give you more credit than any false pretensions could secure.

Have the courage to prefer *propriety to fashion*—one is but the abuse of the other.

Have the courage to listen to your wife, when you should do so, and not to listen when you should not. [This applies to husbands.]

Have the courage to provide a frugal dinner for a friend whom you "delight to honor;" when you cannot afford wine, offer him porter; the importance of most things is that which we ourselves attach to them.

Have the courage to ask a visitor to excuse you when his presence interferes with your convenience.

Have the courage to throw your snuff-box into the fire or the melting-pot; to pass a tobacconist's shop; and to decline the use of a friend's box, or even one pinch.

Have the courage to be independent if you can, and act independently when you may.

INDEX TO THE MAXIMS.

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A

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ANTIQUITY, or the *Wise Instructor:* being a collection of the most valuable *Admonitions and Sentences*, compendiously put together, from an infinite variety of the most celebrated *Christian* and *Heathen Writers*, Divine, Moral, Historical, Poetical, and Political. 12mo. $2.00. *Very rare.* Bristol, 1770.

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